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People with social anxiety disorder tend to expect that the likelihood of social embarrassment 
or negative judgment is much higher when anticipating a social encounter than people without 
the disorder (Lucock & Salkovskis, 1988). This outcome probability bias is theorized to 
contribute to the development and maintenance of symptoms (Clark, 2001; Heimberg et al., 
2010). The causal role of outcome probability bias in social anxiety disorder is unknown, 
however, because all known studies have relied exclusively on paper-and-pencil questionnaires 
to operationalize this construct. The present study aimed to assess the reliability, validity, and 
factor structure of a novel computer task designed to measure outcome probability bias in social 
anxiety. Important components of this task included incorporation of social images and 
assessment of outcome probability bias resulting from both automatic and controlled levels of 
processing. Results from a pilot study indicated the images in the task were appropriate but 
modifications were warranted for assessment of outcome probability bias at an automatic level of 
processing. Results from the main study indicated good to excellent internal consistency among 
social images (α = 0.86 – 0.96). Correlations were consistent with the nomological network. 
Outcome probability bias task ratings were higher in response to social items compared to 
nonsocial items and among people with social anxiety symptom scores above a clinical cutoff 
compared to people with scores below the cutoff (all p values < 0.05). Social images in the task 
also predicted self-reported symptoms of social anxiety, self-reported safety behaviors during a 
behavioral avoidance test, and subjective distress during a behavioral avoidance test (all p values 
< 0.05). The task did not, however, significantly predict performance on a measure of behavioral 
avoidance. Exploratory factor analyses revealed a tripartite factor structure. These findings offer 
preliminary support for the reliability, convergent validity, discriminant validity, construct 
validity, and criterion validity of the outcome probability bias task. This task may potentially be 
used in future research for multimodal assessment and experimental manipulation of outcome 








INDEX WORDS: Social anxiety, Outcome probability bias, Mental imagery, Automatic 
processing, Psychometric properties, Factor structure 
  


















A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the College of Arts and Sciences 
























Amanda Annette Draheim 
2020  









Committee Chair:  Page Anderson 
 





Electronic Version Approved: 
 
 
Office of Graduate Studies 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
May 2021   
iv 
DEDICATION 
























First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude for my mentor, Dr. Page Anderson, 
for bringing me into this program and giving me the freedom to pursue my passion. I would also 
like to thank my co-mentor, Dr. Erin Tone, and my committee members, Dr. Lindsey Cohen and 
Dr. Michael Beran, for their sound feedback and support of this project. 
I am incredibly thankful for the support of my husband, Christopher Draheim, who was 
instrumental in programming and troubleshooting the outcome probability bias task. He also 
consulted on some of the statistical analyses. I would also like to acknowledge Jason Tsukahara 
for his assistance with task programming.  
My thanks to my fellow lab mates for their feedback on task development, study procedures, 
study analyses, and presentations: Tony Molloy, Nancy Su, Donovan Ellis, and Deah Abbott.  
Several undergraduate lab members provided invaluable assistance with data collection, 
including Kate Niven, Shimarith Wallace, Aleysha Delpin, Riven Mendoza, and Taliyah Mosley. 
Thank you. 
Funding support was received from the Brains and Behavior Fellowship and the Health 
Resources and Services Administration. 








TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... X 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................... XII 
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Outcome Probability Bias in Anxiety and Related Disorders ......................... 3 
1.2 Outcome Probability Bias in Social Anxiety Disorder ..................................... 6 
1.3 Mental Imagery in Social Anxiety Disorder ..................................................... 8 
1.4 Mechanisms of Outcome Probability Bias ........................................................ 8 
1.5 Constructs Similar to Outcome Probability Bias ........................................... 13 
1.5.1 Outcome Cost Bias ........................................................................................ 13 
1.5.2 Interpretation Bias ........................................................................................ 15 
1.6 Important Considerations for an Outcome Probability Bias Computer Task
 19 
1.7 Present Study ..................................................................................................... 19 
1.7.1 Pilot Study ..................................................................................................... 19 
1.7.2 Main Study .................................................................................................... 21 
2 METHOD .................................................................................................................. 22 
2.1 Outcome Probability Bias Task ....................................................................... 22 
2.1.1 Controlled Block ........................................................................................... 24 
2.1.2 Automatic Block ............................................................................................ 25 
vii 
2.2 Participants ........................................................................................................ 27 
2.3 Measures ............................................................................................................ 27 
2.3.1 Virtual Reality Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT) ...................................... 27 
2.3.2 Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995)... 28 
2.3.3 Outcome Cost Questionnaire (OCQ; Uren et al., 2004) .............................. 29 
2.3.4 Outcome Probability Questionnaire (OPQ; Uren et al., 2004) ................... 30 
2.3.5 Subtle Avoidance Frequency Examination (SAFE; Cuming et al., 2009) . 30 
2.3.6 Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ; Kennedy et al., 1993) ................ 30 
2.3.7 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-State Form (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1970)
 31 
2.3.8 Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1973) ............................ 31 
2.3.9 Temple Presence Inventory (TPI; Lombard et al., 2009) ............................ 31 
2.3.10 Word Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP; Beard & Amir, 2008) ..... 32 
3 PILOT STUDY ......................................................................................................... 33 
3.1 Participant Characteristics............................................................................... 33 
3.2 Pilot Study Procedure ....................................................................................... 33 
3.3 Pilot Study Results ............................................................................................ 34 
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................... 35 
3.3.2 Feasibility of Stimuli ..................................................................................... 37 
3.3.3 Feasibility of Stimulus Duration in Automatic Block ................................. 43 
viii 
3.3.4 Role of the Availability Heuristic in Outcome Probability Bias.................. 44 
3.4 Pilot Discussion .................................................................................................. 45 
4 MAIN STUDY........................................................................................................... 47 
4.1 Participant Characteristics............................................................................... 47 
4.2 Main Study Procedure ...................................................................................... 48 
4.3 Main Study Results ........................................................................................... 49 
4.3.1 Missing Data Strategy ................................................................................... 49 
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................... 50 
4.3.3 Reliability: Internal Consistency .................................................................. 53 
4.3.4 Convergent and Discriminant Validity......................................................... 53 
4.3.5 Construct Validity ......................................................................................... 54 
4.3.6 Criterion Validity........................................................................................... 60 
4.3.7 Factor Structure ............................................................................................ 64 
4.4 Main Study Discussion ...................................................................................... 71 
4.4.1 Reliability, Convergent Validity, Discriminant Validity, Construct Validity, 
and Criterion Validity ........................................................................................................... 71 
4.4.2 Factor Structure ............................................................................................ 76 
4.4.3 Recommended Changes for Future Use ...................................................... 78 
5 DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 79 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 87 
ix 
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................... 103 
Appendix A: Outcome Probability Bias Task Stimuli ........................................... 103 
Appendix A.1 List of Images Included in Outcome Probability Bias Task .......... 103 
Appendix A.2 Main Study Automatic Block Items ................................................ 106 
Appendix A.3 Outcome Probability Bias Task Images ......................................... 107 
Appendix B: Self Report Questionnaires ................................................................ 110 
Appendix B.1 Outcome Probability Questionnaire ............................................... 110 
Appendix B.2 Outcome Cost Questionnaire .......................................................... 111 
Appendix B.3 Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale ....................................................... 112 
Appendix B.4 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory ......................................................... 114 
Appendix B.5 Depression Anxiety Stress Scale ..................................................... 115 
Appendix B.6 Temple Presence Inventory ............................................................. 116 
Appendix B.7 Simulator Sickness Questionnaire ................................................. 120 
Appendix B.8 Subtle Avoidance Frequency Examination .................................... 121 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1 Means and Standard Deviations for Measures Used in the Pilot Study ....................... 35 
Table 3.2 Means and Standard Deviations for Measures Used in the Pilot Study Separated by 
Social Anxiety Symptom Clinical Cutoff ..................................................................................... 35 
Table 3.3 Zero-order Correlations Among Blocks of the Outcome Probability Task and Paper-
and-pencil Measures of State Anxiety, Outcome Probability Bias, Outcome Cost Bias, and 
Symptoms of Social Anxiety Included in the Pilot Study ............................................................ 36 
Table 3.4 Results from Regression Analyses of the Outcome Probability Bias Task with Paper-
and-pencil Measures of Outcome Probability Bias and Symptoms of Social Anxiety in the Pilot 
Study ............................................................................................................................................. 41 
Table 4.1 Means and Standard Deviations for Measures in the Main Study ................................ 51 
Table 4.2 Means and Standard Deviations Separated by Self-Report Social Anxiety Symptom 
Clinical Cutoff for Measures in the Main Study ........................................................................... 52 
Table 4.3 Zero-Order Correlations Among Blocks of the Outcome Probability Task and Paper-
and-pencil Measures of Outcome Probability Bias, Outcome Cost Bias, Social Anxiety 
Symptoms, Safety Behaviors, Depression, Stress, an Interpretation Bias Task, and Behavioral 
Avoidance for the Main Study ...................................................................................................... 53 
Table 4.4 Results from Regression Analyses Assessing the Relations Among the Outcome 
Probability Bias Task in the Main Study and Symptoms of Social Anxiety, Safety Behaviors, 
Speech Length, and Peak Subjective Units of Distress Controlling for Symptoms of Depression 
and Stress and Interpretation Bias................................................................................................. 63 
Table 4.5 Rotated Factor Loadings from Exploratory Factor Analysis of Outcome Probability 
Bias Task Controlled Block .......................................................................................................... 65 
xi 
Table 4.6 Means and Standard Deviations of Outcome Probability Bias for Each Factor 
Identified in Exploratory Factor Analysis of Controlled Block: Overall and Separated by Social 
Anxiety Symptom Clinical Cutoff ................................................................................................ 69 



















LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1 Sequence for the Controlled Block of the Outcome Probability Bias Task Using a 
Social 3rd Image. ........................................................................................................................... 25 
Figure 2.2 Sequence for the Automatic Block of the Outcome Probability Bias Task in the Main 
Study. ............................................................................................................................................ 26 
Figure 3.1 Mean Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings for Social 1st, Social 3rd, and Control 
Images in the Controlled Block During the Pilot Study ............................................................... 39 
Figure 3.2 Mean Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings for Social 1st, Social 3rd, and Control 
Images in the Automatic Block During the Pilot Study ............................................................... 39 
Figure 4.1 Main Study Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings by Image Type and Block Order 
in the Controlled Block Collapsing Across Social Anxiety Symptom Score ............................... 56 
Figure 4.2 Main Study Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings by Image Type and Social 
Anxiety Symptom Score in the Controlled Block Collapsing Across Block Order ..................... 56 
Figure 4.3 Main Study Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings by Image Type and Block Order 
for the Automatic Block Collapsing Across Social Anxiety Symptom Score.............................. 59 
Figure 4.4 Main Study Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings by Image Type and Social 
Anxiety Symptom Score for the Automatic Block Collapsing Across Block Order .................... 59 
Figure 4.5 Mean Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings for Factor Structures Identified in 
Exploratory Factor Analysis of Controlled Block Separated by Social Anxiety Symptom Clinical 




1 INTRODUCTION  
Outcome probability bias, defined as a person’s tendency to overestimate the likelihood of a 
feared outcome (Foa & Kozak, 1986), has long been theorized to contribute to the development 
and maintenance of social anxiety disorder (Clark, 2001; Clark & Wells, 1995; Heimberg et al., 
2010; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). In line with these theories, widely used cognitive-behavioral 
treatments for social anxiety disorder such as the Unified Protocol and Exposure Group Therapy 
include interventions designed to target and reduce outcome probability bias (Barlow et al., 
2017; Hofmann, 2004). Over the past thirty years, many studies have demonstrated that outcome 
probability bias declines significantly from pre- to post-treatment (Calamaras et al., 2015; Foa et 
al., 1996; Gregory et al., 2015; Hoffart et al., 2009; Lucock & Salkovskis, 1988; McManus et al., 
2000; Moscovitch et al., 2012; O’Toole et al., 2015; Poulton & Andrews, 1996; Rapee et al., 
2009; Smits et al., 2006; Taylor & Alden, 2008; Voncken & Bögels, 2006). Further, evidence 
suggests that outcome probability bias is a specific mechanism through which cognitive-
behavioral therapy for social anxiety disorder contributes to symptom improvement (Calamaras 
et al., 2015; McManus et al., 2000; O’Toole et al., 2015; Smits et al., 2006; Taylor & Alden, 
2008), though some studies have reported null results (Foa et al., 1996; Moscovitch et al., 2012; 
Rapee et al., 2009).  
A major limitation of this literature, however, is that all studies exclusively relied on paper-
and-pencil questionnaires to assess the construct of outcome probability bias. In addition, all 
analyses were correlational in nature. As such, the causal role of outcome probability bias in 
treatment for social anxiety disorder is unknown. This represents a notable gap in the literature 
because accurate understanding of the mechanisms of psychological treatments—simply put, 
why people get better—is needed to refine theory and enhance treatment outcomes (Kazdin, 
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2007). Identification of treatment mechanisms may also promote dissemination efforts.  For 
example, by streamlining treatments to only include interventions that target known mechanisms 
(Cooper et al., 2017).  
Further, the use of multimodal assessment would strengthen the scientific support for the 
mechanistic role of outcome probability bias within social anxiety disorder’s treatment 
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959) because researchers’ confidence in a relation between variables is 
enhanced when the effect is demonstrated using a variety of measures and settings. Computer 
tasks represent one alternative approach to paper-and-pencil questionnaires that may be used to 
measure and/or experimentally manipulate a construct of interest. For example, other forms of 
bias that are characteristic of anxiety disorders such as attention, interpretation, and memory 
biases have been measured via computer tasks (for a recent review of computer tasks designed to 
assess interpretation bias see Schoth & Liossi, 2017). Furthermore, computer tasks designed to 
assess attention and interpretation biases have been adapted to allow for experimental 
manipulation of these biases, termed cognitive bias modification (Hertel & Mathews, 2011). 
Cognitive bias modification paradigms have been used to test causal models of anxiety and 
depression and have demonstrated a small but significant effect on symptoms of anxiety when 
employed as therapeutic interventions (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). A computer task designed to 
assess outcome probability bias in social anxiety could therefore allow for multimodal 
assessment of the construct. It could also serve as a tool for future experimental manipulation 
and intervention.  
An outcome probability bias computer task may also allow for incorporation of elements that 
paper-and-pencil questionnaires can’t capture. For example, by including visual rather than 
verbal stimuli researchers can control the variability in mental imagery participants experience 
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when providing responses about their judgments of outcome probability. A computer task can 
also allow for evaluation of outcome probability bias at different levels of processing, which can 
inform the mechanisms of this construct. As such, the proposed study aims to develop a 
computer task to operationalize outcome probability bias in social anxiety and assess its 
reliability, validity, and factor structure. 
1.1 Outcome Probability Bias in Anxiety and Related Disorders 
Outcome probability bias has been studied extensively over the past fifty years, and 
reductions in outcome probability bias have long been considered a primary mechanism of 
change in cognitive-behavioral treatments for anxiety disorders. Carr (1974) and Beck (1976) 
first introduced the construct. They proposed that anxiety and related disorders are characterized 
by exaggerated perceptions of danger, which may be caused by subjective overestimations of the 
likelihood of a feared outcome (later termed outcome probability bias). Outcome probability bias 
has been identified in a variety of anxiety and related disorders including generalized anxiety 
disorder (Butler & Mathews, 1983), social anxiety disorder (Andrews et al., 1994; Foa et al., 
1996; Lucock & Salkovskis, 1988; McManus et al., 2000; Poulton & Andrews, 1996; Uren et al., 
2004, Voncken et al., 2003), agoraphobia (McNally & Foa, 1987; Poulton & Andrews, 1996), 
specific phobia (Menzies & Clarke, 1995), panic disorder (Uren et al., 2004) and acute stress 
disorder (Warda & Bryant, 1998). Across these studies, outcome probability bias was higher 
among untreated anxious individuals when compared to a non-anxious control group. Further, 
the content of the bias was specific to the type of disorder (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2000; 
Poulton & Andrews, 1996; Uren et al., 2004). For example, people with social anxiety disorder 
demonstrated outcome probability bias for social events but not for physical events (Uren et al., 
4 
2004). Notably, all of these studies used paper-and-pencil questionnaires to measure outcome 
probability bias.  
Cognitive-behavioral treatments for anxiety and related disorders are thought to reduce 
outcome probability bias by means of cognitive restructuring and/or exposure. Cognitive 
restructuring is an intervention that encourages people to assess the validity of their thoughts and 
assumptions (Beck et al., 2005). An example of a technique designed to reduce outcome 
probability bias using cognitive restructuring is the pie method (Voncken & Bögels, 2006). 
When using the pie method, clients are instructed to consider a feared situation and estimate the 
likelihood of all possible outcomes. The probabilities for all included outcomes must add up to 
100 percent. Clients often reduce their initial estimates of the probability of a negative outcome 
in order to allow for the alternatives. Voncken and Bögels (2006) presented data from a pilot 
study of 13 people with social anxiety disorder who reported post-treatment reductions in 
outcome probability bias following nine sessions designed to target this bias using cognitive 
restructuring techniques.  
Exposure to feared stimuli may also reduce outcome probability bias. Exposure therapy is a 
treatment that arose from classical conditioning research and is based on the idea that anxiety 
and related disorders are maintained by avoidance (Wolpe, 1958). Classical conditioning 
experiments that have informed the development of exposure therapy were conducted on animals 
and typically involved conditioning a fear response. For example, following multiple 
presentations of a neutral stimulus (a tone) paired with an unconditioned stimulus (shock), 
animals learn to fear the tone and demonstrate a fear response (freezing) even when the tone is 
presented in the absence of shock. Fear responding declines during extinction, where the 
conditioned stimulus (the tone) is presented in the absence of shock repeatedly. Research on the 
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factors that promote successful extinction of fear responding is the basis for exposure therapy in 
humans. During exposure therapy, clients are encouraged to repeatedly face feared stimuli in a 
variety of contexts for prolonged periods (Foa & Kozak, 1986). For example, a client with a 
specific phobia of spiders would be encouraged to repeatedly look at, approach, and eventually 
hold a spider in multiple settings.  
Foa and Kozak (1986) proposed that reductions in outcome probability bias may represent a 
mechanism through which exposure therapy leads to improvement in symptoms of anxiety. The 
authors suggested that the reductions in fear that occur over the course of multiple exposures to 
the feared stimulus (i.e. between-session habituation) could lead to more accurate predictions of 
the likelihood of a feared outcome. The authors posited that these reductions in outcome 
probability bias that result from exposure therapy would, in turn, lead to symptom reduction.  
Basic science research demonstrates that manipulation of expectations about the likelihood of 
a feared outcome (achieved by varying the rates of association between the unconditioned and 
the conditioned stimuli) influences the effectiveness of fear response extinction (Gallistel & 
Gibbon, 2000; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). More specifically, greater expectancy violations are 
associated with decreased fear responding. For example, Rescorla and Wagner (1972) describe a 
study where 36 rabbits underwent fear conditioning using three different stimuli. During the 
acquisition phase, one stimulus (randomly assigned as either a flashing light or a chest vibration) 
was trained to be highly salient when paired with an eye shock at irregular intervals over the 
course of 224 trials. A second, less salient stimulus (either the flashing light or chest vibration, 
whichever had not been trained as highly salient), was paired with the eye shock at irregular 
intervals over 28 trials. As such, the highly salient stimulus was associated with greater 
expectation for negative outcome (comparable to greater outcome probability bias). All rabbits 
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also underwent 224 trials during which a tone was paired with a shock at irregular intervals 
(therefore the tone was highly salient across groups). During the extinction phase, the tone was 
paired with either the highly salient stimulus (in half of the rabbits) or the low salience stimulus 
(the other half) in the absence of punishment for 32 trials. Arguably, greater expectancy violation 
would take place when the highly salient stimulus was paired with the tone in the absence of 
punishment relative to the low salient stimulus. Consistent with this hypothesis, the researchers 
found that animals’ fear responses declined significantly faster during extinction of the highly 
salient stimulus pair. Reacquisition training, during which the tone was again paired with shock, 
was used to test the effectiveness of extinction learning. The researchers found that return of the 
fear response took longer when the tone had been paired with the highly salient stimulus during 
extinction. These findings suggest that fear extinction was more resistant to reacquisition as a 
result of greater expectancy violation.  
Based on these results, Craske et al. (2008) argue that expectancy violations are essential for 
effective exposure therapy. Violations in expectations may be achieved in humans by means of 
presentation of a feared stimulus in the absence of punishment (i.e. exposure) or through 
discussion and logic (i.e. cognitive interventions such as cognitive restructuring). Reductions in 
outcome probability bias may therefore represent a mechanism of expectancy violation in 
cognitive restructuring and in exposure therapy. 
1.2 Outcome Probability Bias in Social Anxiety Disorder  
Expectancy violations may be particularly difficult to achieve during exposure therapy for 
social anxiety disorder. Social anxiety disorder is characterized by persistent and excessive fear 
of social interactions in which there is potential for negative evaluation (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Many social outcomes tend to be ambiguous, and the baseline likelihood that 
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a feared outcome might occur (e.g. someone turns you down when you ask them out on a date) is 
higher compared to feared outcomes for other anxiety disorders (e.g. having a heart attack, a 
common fear among people with panic disorder; Foa & Kozak, 1986). As such, outcome 
probability bias may be more resistant to change in treatment for social anxiety disorder relative 
to other anxiety disorders (Poulton & Andrews, 1996). If so, further research on ways to 
effectively measure and reduce outcome probability bias specifically for people with social 
anxiety disorder would be useful. 
Outcome probability bias has been identified as a factor that contributes to the development 
and maintenance of symptoms in cognitive models of social anxiety disorder (Clark, 2001; Clark 
& Wells, 1995; Heimberg et al., 2010; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Clark and Wells’ (1995) 
model posits that distorted assumptions and beliefs about social performance lead to exaggerated 
perceptions of social danger – that a socially anxious person believes they will likely behave “in 
an inept and unacceptable fashion” (p. 69). According to this model, perception of social danger 
represents a core maintenance factor of social anxiety that contributes to and is reinforced by 
self-focused attentional shift as well as cognitive, somatic, and behavioral symptoms of social 
anxiety. Hoffart et al. (2009) explicitly stated that outcome probability bias likely contributes to 
the development and maintenance of the perception of social danger identified in the Clark and 
Wells (1995) model. Rapee and Heimberg (1997) also propose that outcome probability bias 
contributes to fear in social situations, which subsequently exacerbates symptoms of social 
anxiety and maintains the disorder. Their model emphasizes the role of imagery. Specifically, it 
postulates that people with social anxiety disorder form mental representations of themselves 
from a third person perspective (i.e. seeing oneself from the perspective of an audience). Mental 
imagery, in turn, predicts outcome probability bias. As these cognitive models have been updated 
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to reflect more recent research findings, outcome probability bias has been retained as central to 
the development and maintenance of social anxiety disorder (Clark, 2001; Heimberg et al., 
2010). 
1.3 Mental Imagery in Social Anxiety Disorder 
Many studies have supported Heimberg et al.’s (2010) emphasis on the role of mental 
imagery in social anxiety disorder. For example, researchers have found that socially anxious 
individuals demonstrate enhanced emotional responding when presented with images relative to 
words (Acosta & Vila, 1990; Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Holmes et al., 2006; Lang et al., 1983; 
Vrana et al., 1986).  Evidence suggests individuals with social anxiety disorder report 
experiencing higher frequencies of mental images in the context of social encounters relative to 
non-anxious controls (Hackmann et al., 1998). Further, spontaneous images commonly described 
by socially anxious individuals typically come from an observer perspective and are often more 
negative and distorted (Hackmann et al., 1998; Wells et al., 1998). In addition, engagement in 
negative mental representations using the observer perspective is associated with increased 
symptoms of social anxiety and impairs performance (Hirsch et al., 2003; Hirsch et al., 2004; 
Spurr & Stopa, 2003; Stopa & Jenkins, 2007; Vassilopoulos, 2005). Taken together, mental 
imagery appears to play a central role in anticipatory anxiety experienced by individuals with 
social anxiety disorder, yet no known studies have evaluated outcome probability bias using 
visual stimuli.  
1.4 Mechanisms of Outcome Probability Bias 
An image-based measure of outcome probability bias should be informed by theoretical 
mechanisms of the construct (Embretson, 1983). Butler and Mathews (1983) published results 
from the first measure of outcome probability bias and posited that maladaptive judgments about 
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the likelihood of a feared outcome may result from employment of the availability and 
representativeness heuristics.  
The availability heuristic refers to people’s tendency to estimate the likelihood of an outcome 
based on the ease with which the outcome comes to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Certain 
outcomes may come to mind more easily than others due to increased familiarity, salience, or 
imaginability. For example, after hearing several news reports about shark attacks, people may 
overestimate the likelihood of being attacked by a shark when considering a trip to the beach. 
This overestimation is arguably due to the increased ease with which lethal shark attacks come to 
mind after hearing about them in the news. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) conducted a series of 
experiments designed to demonstrate how use of the availability heuristic can lead to inaccurate 
probability estimates. In one such experiment, participants were instructed to estimate whether a 
given letter of the alphabet, such as the letter r, appears more commonly in the first or the third 
position of a typical English word. On average, participants reported (inaccurately) that the letter 
r appears more commonly in the first position. The authors concluded that this common mistake 
occurs because words that begin with the letter r come to mind more easily than words with r in 
the third position. Regarding anxiety disorders, Butler and Mathews (1983) posited that feared 
outcomes may come to mind more easily than alternative outcomes.  
The representativeness heuristic also contributes to inaccurate estimates of probability. When 
relying on the representativeness heuristic, people tend to judge an outcome as more likely to 
occur when the outcome more closely matches their mental representation of its category. For 
example, when asked to judge which series of coin toss outcomes was more likely, HTTHTH or 
HHHTTT, people tended to assume that the first outcome was more probable than the latter 
despite the fact that both outcomes are equally likely. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) concluded 
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that this inaccurate judgment of probability typically happens because the first outcome best 
matches common understanding of the randomness and proportion (1/2) of the coin toss process. 
According to Butler and Mathews (1983), individuals with an anxiety disorder may tend to 
associate a variety of stimuli with a mental category of fear. For instance, increased heartrate can 
result from several causes, but an individual with panic disorder may be more likely to assume 
that rapid heartrate is representative of a heart attack. 
Kahneman (2011) argued that the availability and representativeness heuristics occur as a 
result of automatic processing, as described by the dual-process information-processing model 
(Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), which distinguishes between two 
different types of information-processing: automatic and controlled. Automatic processing can 
be defined as speeded processing that occurs with minimal effort and without conscious 
awareness. For example, a skilled reader can decode the letters in this sentence and access the 
meaning of these words quickly and with little effort. Controlled processing involves relatively 
slower and more intentional processing. For example, quickly counting all the commas and 
periods on this page would require conscious and sustained attention and effort. Research 
conducted with individuals with brain damage demonstrates the dissociation between automatic 
and controlled processing (Birnboim, 2003).  
Studies evaluating the ease-of-retrieval effect support Kahneman’s (2011) assertion that the 
availability heuristic manifests in automatic processing more so than controlled processing. 
Schwartz et al. (1991) reported an ease-of-retrieval effect when they found that people who were 
instructed to recall 6 instances of engaging in assertive behavior rated themselves as more 
assertive than those who were required to recall 12 examples. The authors attributed this 
difference to less difficulty in retrieving examples of assertiveness when the number of examples 
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was low because easier retrieval facilitates the availability heuristic and biases judgments 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This effect was also demonstrated for judgments of probability. 
In a similar study, Raghubir and Menon (1998) found that people judged their risk of contracting 
AIDS as higher when it was easier for them to retrieve examples of AIDS-related behaviors from 
memory. Menon and Raghubir (2003) conducted a series of experiments designed to assess the 
automaticity of this ease-of-retrieval effect. In the first study, 133 undergraduate students saw an 
advertisement highlighting ten product features for a type of personal computer. Some students 
were instructed to recall two of the features (easy retrieval) and others were instructed to recall 
eight (difficult retrieval); participants in the easy retrieval condition rated the personal computer 
more favorably than participants in the difficult retrieval condition. This result replicated 
findings from Schwartz et al. (1991) and Raghubir and Menon (1998), demonstrating an ease-of-
retrieval effect. In the second study, participants were informed that the task of recalling eight 
product features was difficult, which brought attention to the fact that ease-of-retrieval influences 
judgment. This discredited the informational value of the ease-of-retrieval cue by promoting 
more intentional thinking (i.e. controlled processing) and reversed the ease-of-retrieval effect. 
The authors concluded reversal of the ease-of-retrieval effect under conditions allowing for 
controlled processing supports the automaticity of this effect. Results from the third study 
revealed that the timing of the presentation of cue discreditation, before or after the recall task, 
influenced the ease-of-retrieval effect. When the difficulty of the task was communicated after 
the recall task was completed and students had already experienced difficulty in retrieval, 
evaluative judgments of the favorability of the product were immune to discounting information. 
This supports the uncontrollability of the influence of ease-of-retrieval on judgment, supporting 
automaticity. Finally, in the fourth study, discrediting information about the difficulty of the task 
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failed to influence the impact of ease-of-retrieval on favorability judgments when participants 
were under high cognitive load, and thus were unable to engage in the controlled processing 
necessary to override responding that results from known bias. This finding further supports the 
conclusion that the ease-of-retrieval effect is dependent upon conditions where automatic 
processing predominates, and controlled processing is not possible. Taken together, the authors 
argued that these studies support the claim that the availability heuristic influences judgements 
by means of automatic processing.  
Based on the impact ease-of-retrieval has on judgments of probability and likeability, simply 
imagining an event can make it seem more likely to occur. For example, Carroll (1978) 
conducted two experiments that demonstrated the effect of imagining on the availability heuristic 
in a sample of undergraduate students. In the first study, participants who imagined that Jimmy 
Carter would win the presidential election later judged that Carter was more likely to win than 
participants who were instructed to imagine Gerald Ford winning. This effect was present 
regardless of students’ prior beliefs about the election. In the second study, participants imagined 
either a good or bad future college football season. Those who imagined a good season predicted 
that their team had a greater chance of achieving a major bowl bid than those who imagined a 
poor season.  
The tendency to engage in negative mental imagery in anticipation of social encounters 
(Hackmann et al., 1998; Wells et al., 1998) may activate the availability heuristic and contribute 
to outcome probability bias among people with social anxiety disorder. In light of the findings 
discussed above (Carroll, 1978; Menon & Raghubir, 2003), outcome probability bias may 
therefore manifest at automatic levels of processing. To date, outcome probability bias has only 
been assessed using paper-and-pencil questionnaires, reflective of controlled processing. The 
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present study is the first to assesses outcome probability bias at both automatic and controlled 
levels of processing. 
1.5 Constructs Similar to Outcome Probability Bias 
In addition to identifying the theoretical mechanisms of a construct of interest when 
developing a new measure, it is also important to identify conceptually similar constructs in the 
literature (Embretson, 1983). It is necessary to use theory to demonstrate how the construct of 
interest is distinguishable from other constructs in order to justify the need for a new measure. 
Identification of similar constructs is also useful for informing evaluation of convergent validity: 
the new measure should correlate with measures of theoretically related constructs (Campbell & 
Fiske, 1959; DeVellis, 2011). Two such constructs related to outcome probability bias include 
outcome cost bias and interpretation bias.  
1.5.1 Outcome Cost Bias 
Cognitive models of social anxiety disorder posit that a related, yet distinct construct, 
outcome cost bias, also contributes to the development and maintenance of symptoms of social 
anxiety disorder (Clark, 2001; Clark & Wells, 1995; Heimberg et al., 2010; Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997). Outcome cost bias is defined as a person’s tendency to overestimate the negative 
consequences of a feared outcome (Foa & Kozak, 1986).   
Several studies have compared the differential impact of outcome probability and cost biases 
on symptoms of social anxiety. Foa et al. (1996) reported that outcome cost bias was a stronger 
predictor of reduction in symptoms of social anxiety than was outcome probability bias. 
McManus et al. (2000) found that both outcome probability bias and outcome cost bias were 
equally predictive of symptom reduction. They also reported that reductions in outcome cost bias 
did not explain a significant degree of additional variance in symptom reduction after controlling 
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for reductions in outcome probability bias. Notably, these studies used hierarchical linear 
modeling to explore these differences and were limited by small sample sizes. In addition, 
temporality was not established in these analyses (assessments only took place at pre- and post-
treatment). Temporality is necessary to establish causal mediation (Kazdin, 2007). In contrast, 
two studies have used more rigorous methodological designs (e.g. longitudinal) and statistical 
methods (e.g. path analysis) to explore and compare the mechanistic role of outcome probability 
and cost biases in treatment for social anxiety disorder (Calamaras et al., 2015; Smits et al., 
2006).  
Using archival data from a randomized controlled trial (n = 53), Smits et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that reductions in outcome probability bias predicted symptom reduction; 
reductions in outcome cost bias, however, were the result of symptom reduction. The authors 
used a longitudinal design and cross-lagged panel analysis to test this mediation. Of note, 
treatment outcome was defined as reductions in fear levels following exposure sessions. 
Reductions in subjective reports of fear during exposure are not considered to be adequate 
predictors of symptom reduction (Craske et al., 2008), thus limiting the value of these findings.  
Calamaras et al. (2015) also employed a cross-lagged panel design to assess the mediational 
effect of outcome probability and cost biases on social anxiety symptom improvement. They 
included a rival mediator in their analyses: the working alliance, defined as the quality of the 
relationship between the client and the therapist (Horvath et al., 2011). Self-report measures with 
known psychometric properties were used for all variables of interest. Analyses were conducted 
using combined archival data from a randomized controlled trial assessing the efficacy of virtual 
reality exposure therapy for social anxiety disorder (Anderson et al., 2013) as well as an 
uncontrolled trial examining the predictive relation between amygdala activity and symptom 
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reduction (total n = 86). The authors found that early decline in outcome probability bias, but not 
outcome cost bias, was a significant mediator of symptom reduction while controlling for the 
working alliance.  
Taken together, these findings support the mechanistic role of outcome probability bias, but 
not outcome cost bias, in cognitive-behavioral treatment for social anxiety disorder. They also 
support the dissociation of these two constructs. Though a computer measure of outcome cost 
bias could further facilitate evaluation of cognitive models of social anxiety disorder, this is 
outside the scope of the current study.  
1.5.2 Interpretation Bias 
It appears that outcome probability bias and interpretation bias may have been conflated by 
some researchers. Interpretation bias refers to the tendency to interpret ambiguous social stimuli 
as threatening. For example, lack of an immediate response to a text message sent to a romantic 
partner (ambiguous) can be interpreted in a benign manner (they are currently busy at work and 
will get back to me later) or a threatening manner (they are avoiding me because they want to 
break up). Negative interpretation bias has been identified as a potential mechanism for the 
development and maintenance of anxiety disorders, including social anxiety disorder (see 
Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005).  
Butler and Mathews’ (1983) first assessment of cognitive processes in anxiety evaluated 
hypotheses related to interpretation bias, outcome cost bias, and outcome probability bias. Three 
different measures were used, one for each construct. For the interpretation bias measure, 
participants filled out a paper-and-pencil questionnaire that presented them with a variety of 
ambiguous scenarios. Participants wrote down their initial interpretation of the situation, then 
ranked three possible disambiguating explanations from most to least likely. One of the possible 
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disambiguating explanations was threatening. More frequent selections of threatening 
explanations reflected interpretation bias. The measure of outcome cost involved a list of 
threatening items. Participants rated the items based on the prompt “how bad would it be for 
you?” Higher ratings reflected greater outcome cost bias. To measure outcome probability bias, 
participants rated the likelihood that positive and negative events would happen to themselves 
and someone else from “not at all likely” to “extremely likely.” Participants’ ratings of greater 
likelihood that negative events would happen to them rather than someone else reflected 
outcome probability bias. Current measures of outcome probability bias are very similar to this 
original measure, though they only include negative events (e.g. Outcome Probability 
Questionnaire; Uren et al., 2004). They only allow for measurement of these biases in response 
to a limited number of social situations and can only reflect bias present at a controlled level of 
processing. In addition, mental imagery participants experience in response to items on these 
questionnaires is likely to be highly variable, and some participants may struggle to generate 
mental imagery in response to a paper-and-pencil questionnaire format. 
The simultaneous introduction of these constructs could imply that outcome cost and 
probability biases are subtypes of interpretation bias. Supporting this view, Mathews and 
MacLeod (1994) stated outcome probability bias reflects “patterns of judgment [that] reflect the 
operation in anxious and depressed individuals of an interpretative bias that favors emotionally 
negative interpretations of ambiguous information” (p. 31). They subsequently described 
different measures of interpretation bias, suggesting that outcome probability bias and 
interpretation bias are the same construct.  
Outcome probability bias is arguably distinct from interpretation bias because it manifests in 
anticipation of a negative outcome and may result from more automatic processing relative to 
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interpretation bias, which is commonly assessed during an ambiguous situation. In support of 
this view, Beck and Clark (1997) presented an information processing model of anxiety 
composed of three stages: initial registration, immediate preparation, and secondary elaboration. 
Initial registration is considered to be driven by automatic processing, immediate preparation by 
a combination of automatic and controlled processing, and secondary elaboration primarily by 
controlled processing. The second stage, immediate preparation, includes “a constriction or 
narrowing of cognitive processing that leads to certain biases and inaccuracies” such that “there 
is an overestimation of the probability and severity of the threatening situation” (p. 53). The 
subsequent secondary elaboration stage involves a “secondary appraisal process” (p. 53) where 
people may interpret the level of threat and evaluate their ability to cope. The authors’ 
description of this model indicates that outcome probability bias manifests in the immediate 
preparation stage and interpretation bias manifests in the secondary elaboration stage. Given 
Beck and Clark’s (1997) assertion that these stages differ in the degree to which automatic 
processing predominates, we might expect outcome probability bias to manifest at both 
automatic and controlled levels of processing and interpretation bias to only manifest at 
controlled levels of processing.  
Automatic processes are often assessed by instructing participants to respond rapidly, before 
conscious processing can influence performance. Manipulation of stimulus presentation rates 
may therefore be used to distinguish between automatic and controlled processes. Calvo and 
Castillo (1997) conducted a series of experiments designed to evaluate the extent to which 
interpretation bias is a result of automatic processing among a sample of undergraduate students 
with high trait anxiety. Participants were instructed to read ambiguous sentences that were 
designed to prime a threatening interpretation (e.g., “At night, the old woman was crossing the 
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motorway on foot when a lorry approached her at high speed”). Sentences were presented at a 
rapid pace designed to minimize exposure time to the words and curtail controlled processing. 
Participants subsequently read disambiguating sentences that contained a single target word (e.g., 
*death*), which resolved the scenario in either a threatening or non-threatening manner. 
Participants were instructed to read the target word out loud as quickly as possible without 
making any errors. The target word was presented for either 500ms or 1,250ms duration. 
Presence of interpretation bias (operationalized as faster naming of the threatening words and 
slower naming of non-threatening words) at the shorter or longer durations reflected automatic or 
controlled processing, respectively. The authors found that interpretation bias was present with 
the longer, but not the shorter, stimulus duration. Consistent with Beck and Clark’s (1997) 
model, Calvo and Castillo (1997) concluded that interpretation bias results only from controlled 
processing. Several other studies have also found that interpretation bias is not present at short 
(500ms) stimulus durations (Calvo, 2000; Calvo & Castillo, 1998; Calvo & Castillo, 2001; Calvo 
et al., 1997; Calvo et al., 1999; Richards & French, 1992). These findings support the conclusion 
that interpretation bias manifests in the secondary elaboration stage and results from controlled, 
but not automatic processing.  
Given that outcome probability bias may manifest in the immediate preparation stage and 
result from automatic and controlled levels of processing (Beck & Clark, 1997), we may expect 
outcome probability bias to manifest following rapid and slow presentations of stimuli. This 
would support the dissociation of interpretation bias from outcome probability bias, but is not 
possible to test with current measures of outcome probability bias. 
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1.6 Important Considerations for an Outcome Probability Bias Computer Task 
Two important factors to consider in the development of this task included the incorporation 
of mental imagery of social situations that elicit an observer perspective as well as assessment of 
outcome probability bias at both automatic and controlled levels of processing. Given that 
emotional responding is enhanced in socially anxious individuals when presented with images 
relative to words (Acosta & Vila, 1990; Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Holmes et al., 2006; Lang et 
al., 1983; Vrana et al., 1986) and that socially anxious individuals tend to imagine social 
situations using third person imagery (Hackmann et al., 1998; Wells et al., 1998), incorporation 
of social images that elicit an observer perspective may enhance the ecological validity of the 
present task. In addition, Beck and Clark’s (1997) information processing model for anxiety 
suggests that outcome probability bias may manifest at automatic and controlled levels of 
processing. The present task was designed to assess bias that may result from automatic and/or 
controlled processing by varying the duration of stimulus presentation rates.  
1.7 Present Study 
A pilot study was conducted to assess the feasibility of images included in the task and to 
evaluate whether the automatic block (involving rapid presentation of images) successfully 
evaluated automatic responding with a minimum of controlled processing. Second, the main 
study was conducted to evaluate the task’s reliability, validity, and factor structure in a larger 
sample. In both studies, a secondary aim was to evaluate the role of the availability heuristic in 
outcome probability bias. 
1.7.1 Pilot Study 
The pilot study aimed to evaluate the following: 1) internal consistency, 2) the effect of the 
outcome probability bias task on state anxiety, 3) adequate distinction between social and 
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nonsocial images, 4) differences in outcome probability bias task ratings among those with 
symptoms of social anxiety above and below a clinical cutoff score, and 5) whether social 
images from the outcome probability bias task were related to paper-and-pencil measures of 
outcome probability bias and symptoms of social anxiety. Participants also provided feedback 
about the images and the task design (e.g. if it was easy to imagine themselves in the social 
situations presented by the images). 
Internal consistency is a measure of reliability and refers to the degree of correlation among 
items in a measure (Cronbach, 1970). Items that measure the same construct should demonstrate 
strong intercorrelations. In the pilot study, individual images that reduced internal consistency or 
demonstrated weak correlation with the mean rating for that stimulus type would be removed. In 
addition, I hypothesized that: 1) state anxiety would increase following completion of the 
outcome probability bias task for all participants, 2) outcome probability bias task ratings for 
social images would be higher relative to nonsocial images among all participants, 3) ratings for 
social images would be higher for those reporting symptoms of social anxiety above the clinical 
cutoff compared to those with symptoms below the cutoff, and 4) social images would be related 
to paper-and-pencil measures of outcome probability bias and symptoms of social anxiety, but 
nonsocial images would not.  
The stimulus presentation interval during the automatic block (involving rapid presentation 
of images) was evaluated by accuracy and confidence ratings for comprehension questions that 
followed the automatic trials. Accuracy ratings above the level of chance would likely indicate 
controlled processing was not sufficiently minimized. Participants also provided anecdotal 
feedback about the automatic trials. 
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Regarding the role of the availability heuristic in outcome probability bias, I hypothesized 
that participants who were familiar with the images would respond to automatic trials with 
higher outcome probability bias task ratings relative to those who were unfamiliar with the 
images. Half of the participants were familiar with the images because they completed the 
automatic trials after rating the same images at slower presentation rates. The other half had 
never been exposed to the images before completing the automatic trials and were therefore 
unfamiliar with the images. Because familiarity promotes engagement of the availability 
heuristic at the automatic level of processing (Kahneman, 2011), higher ratings in response to 
automatic trials among the half of participants who were familiar with the images would support 
the effect of the availability heuristic on outcome probability bias, as Butler and Mathews (1983) 
posited.  
1.7.2 Main Study 
The aim of the main study was to evaluate the reliability, convergent validity, discriminant 
validity, construct validity, criterion validity, and factor structure of the outcome probability bias 
task. Reliability was assessed with internal consistency. Convergent and discriminant validity 
were evaluated by examining the strength of associations between conceptually similar and 
distinct constructs, respectively (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; DeVellis, 2011). Stronger associations 
were expected between the outcome probability bias task and conceptually similar measures 
(paper-and-pencil measures of outcome probability and cost biases) relative to conceptually 
distinct measures (paper-and-pencil measures of symptoms of depression and stress).  
Construct validity refers to a measure’s operationalization: does it truly measure what it is 
intended to measure? (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; DeVellis, 2011; Embretson, 1983). In the 
present study, people scoring above the social anxiety symptom clinical cutoff score were 
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expected to report a greater likelihood of being embarrassed, humiliated, or negatively judged 
than people scoring below the clinical cut-off. I expected this effect would be present in response 
to social images but not for nonsocial control images. Evaluation of theorized mechanisms of 
outcome probability bias may also support construct validity. Butler and Mathews (1983) posited 
that outcome probability bias results from the availability heuristic, which manifests at the 
automatic level of processing and is enhanced by familiarity (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). As 
such, higher outcome probability bias task ratings in response to rapidly presented familiar 
images relative to rapidly presented novel images would support the theorized effect of the 
availability heuristic on outcome probability bias.  
Criterion validity refers to the extent to which a measure is associated with an outcome 
(DeVellis, 2011). In the present study, I expected that higher scores on the outcome probability 
bias task would predict higher self-report and behavioral symptoms of social anxiety and self-
reported safety behaviors. If these relations remained significant while controlling for 
interpretation bias, stress and depression, this would provide additional support for the 
discriminant validity of the task. This result would also support the dissociation of outcome 
probability bias and interpretation bias. 
Factor structure of the outcome probability task was assessed using exploratory factor 
analysis. Given that this was an exploratory evaluation of a novel measure, the only hypothesis I 
identified was that social and nonsocial images might represent two distinct factors.  
2 METHOD 
2.1 Outcome Probability Bias Task 
The outcome probability task contained three types of stimuli: social images that elicited an 
observer perspective (social 3rd person), social images that elicited a first-person perspective 
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(social 1st person), and images that did not have a social component (control). Details about the 
stimuli, including the images themselves, are included in Appendix A. Some images (primarily 
control images) came from the Set of Fear Inducing Pictures (SFIP) database (Michałowski et 
al., 2017) or the Nencki Affective Picture System database (NAPS; Marchewka et al., 2014). The 
SFIP and NAPS are composed of several high-quality images with established fear, valence, and 
arousal ratings. The SFIP database includes 40 social images shown to elicit higher levels of fear 
among undergraduate students with high levels of social anxiety. All control images in the 
present outcome probability bias task came from the SFIP and the NAPS. Some social images 
also came from the SFIP (12 images) or the NAPS (three images). The remainder of the social 
images were stock photos downloaded from Canva (https://www.canva.com/).  
Social images depicted commonly feared and avoided social situations identified in 
questionnaires used to assess socially anxious populations with known psychometric properties, 
including the Outcome Probability Bias Questionnaire (Uren et al., 2004) and the Liebowitz 
Social Anxiety Scale - Self Report Version (Liebowitz, 1987). For social 3rd person images, one 
person in the photo was photoshopped so that their gender, age, and race could not easily be 
perceived. Participants were instructed to imagine themselves as the photoshopped person to 
elicit a 3rd person perspective.  
All images were presented in a randomized order. The task consisted of two blocks 
(automatic and controlled) that differed in terms of stimulus presentation rates. Blocks were 
counterbalanced to assess for possible order effects: participants with an odd identification 
number completed the automatic block first and participants with an even identification number 
completed the controlled block first. E-prime was used to administer the task. 
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2.1.1 Controlled Block 
In the controlled block, participants received the following instructions:  
For this part of the task, you are going to see a series of images showing situations you 
might encounter in your daily life. In some of these images, you will see a blurry outline 
of a person that represents you (3rd person perspective). In others, imagine you are seeing 
what is shown in the picture in the real world (1st person perspective).  
Participants then saw three example images: a social 3rd image, a social 1st image, and a control 
image. Images were accompanied by instructions to “imagine you are the blurry figure” for the 
3rd person image and to “imagine you are seeing what is shown in the picture in the real world” 
for the social 1st and control images. The following instruction screens stated:  
You may take as much time as you like to imagine you will soon experience what is 
shown in the picture. Then, when you are ready, press the spacebar. For each picture, you 
will use the slide bar to rate the likelihood that you are about to be embarrassed, 
humiliated, or negatively judged from 0 – 100% likely. Move the mouse left and right to 
adjust the slider. Left click the mouse to submit your response. A rating of 100% (all the 
way to the right side of the scale) indicates that you feel you will DEFINITELY be 
embarrassed, humiliated, or negatively judged. A rating of 0% (all the way to the left side 
of the scale) indicates that you feel you DEFINITELY WILL NOT be embarrassed, 
humiliated, or negatively judged. You may give any rating between 0-100%. 
Participants completed six practice trials, two of each stimulus type, before completing the 
task. During the task, participants viewed each image for as long as they liked. After viewing the 
image, participants pressed the space bar to indicate they successfully imagined they were about 
to encounter the pictured situation. On the next screen, participants rated the likelihood of being 
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embarrassed, humiliated, or negatively judged from 0-100% using a visual analogue scale. The 
slider always started in the middle of the visual analogue scale, at 50%.  The controlled block 
sequence is presented in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Sequence for the Controlled Block of the Outcome Probability Bias Task 
Using a Social 3rd Image. 
 
2.1.2 Automatic Block 
In the automatic block, images were presented rapidly (67ms each). Given the parameters of 
the equipment used for task administration, this was the shortest possible presentation rate that 
has been shown to be long enough to influence responding (Ionescu, 2016). Participants received 
the following instructions:  
For this part of the task, you are going to be rating some images of situations you might 
encounter in your daily life. First, you will see a cross in the middle of the screen. Focus 
your attention on the cross. Then there will be several brief flashes of images. Do your 
best to pay attention to the images, even if they go by too quickly for you to see them. 
You will use a slide bar to rate the likelihood that you are about to be embarrassed, 
humiliated, or negatively judged from 0 – 100% likely (if you were about to encounter 
what you see in the images). Move the mouse left and right to adjust the slider. Left click 
the mouse to submit your response. Give your rating as quickly as possible. A rating of 
100% (all the way to the right side of the scale) indicates that you feel you will 
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DEFINITELY be embarrassed, humiliated, or negatively judged. A rating of 0% (all the 
way to the left side of the scale) indicates that you feel you DEFINITELY WILL NOT be 
embarrassed, humiliated, or negatively judged. You may give any rating between 0-
100%. After you rate the images you will then be asked to identify a description of an 
image that was just shown, and how confident you are in your choice 
Participants completed two practice trials, one with control images and the other with social 
images. During the task, participants were presented with a fixation cross for 2,500 milliseconds. 
Then, 3 (main study) or 5 (pilot study) images from the same stimulus type were presented for 
67ms each. After the last image, participants rated the likelihood of being embarrassed, 
humiliated, or negatively judged from 0-100% likely on a visual analogue scale. The slider 
always started in the middle of the visual analogue scale, at 50%. Participants subsequently 
completed a multiple-choice comprehension question asking them to identify the correct 
description of an image that was just shown from three options. Next, participants rated the 
degree of confidence they had in their choice when responding to the comprehension question on 
a four-point Likert-type scale. Possible responses included “not at all confident,” “somewhat 
confident,” “mostly confident,” and “completely confident.” The automatic block sequence is 
presented in Figure 2.2. 
 




Participants were recruited through the Georgia State University undergraduate psychology 
research participant pool and received class credit for their participation. To be eligible for the 
pilot study, participants were adults who were fluent in English. For the main study, participants 
were also required to be able to wear a virtual reality headset and could not have a history of 
seizures. 
2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 Virtual Reality Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT)   
The BAT is based on a commonly used standardized speech assessment protocol (Beidel et 
al., 1989) and involves the delivery of an impromptu speech to a small group of confederates 
who are instructed to maintain a neutral facial expression.  Participants are instructed to speak for 
ten minutes but are given the option to discontinue the speech at any point. Speech topics (e.g. 
healthcare, abortion) are challenging or controversial in order to elicit high anxiety. The BAT is 
commonly used as a behavioral measure of social anxiety, particularly in social anxiety treatment 
studies (Coles & Heimberg 2000; Heimberg et al., 1998).  Speech length has been shown to be a 
reliable measure of “escape” or behavioral avoidance (Beidel et al., 1989).  
In the present study, this measure was used to test the criterion validity of the outcome 
probability bias task. A virtual audience was used rather than confederates. Research shows that 
virtual reality exposure therapy significantly reduces public speaking fears from pre- to post-
treatment among individuals with social anxiety disorder (Anderson et al., 2005), and treatment 
using virtual reality is just as effective as group exposure therapy (Anderson et al., 2013). 
Application of virtual reality for a BAT has been shown to be feasible for assessment of spider 
phobia (Mühlberger et al., 2008) but has not been assessed for public speaking anxiety.  
28 
A Shinecon virtual reality headset was used to administer the virtual reality BAT. An iPhone 
was placed in the headset, and the VirtualSpeech app was used for the virtual environment. 
Participants gave their speech in the “meeting room,” which is composed of 11 avatars arranged 
around a conference table. All the avatars were dressed professionally and maintained neutral 
facial expressions. They sometimes nodded, drank coffee, and took notes. Two avatars were 
standing, one on each side of the conference table. One of the standing avatars never made eye 
contact and was seen using his phone throughout the speech. Avatars did not speak. A laptop was 
present on the table in front of the viewer and acted as a stopwatch that began as soon as the 
participant entered the virtual environment. 
2.3.2 Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995)  
The DASS is a 21-item measure of symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress. This 
measure was used to assess discriminant validity of the outcome probability bias task. 
Participants rate how frequently they experienced symptoms over the past week from 0 (did not 
apply to me at all-never) to 3 (applied to me very much, or most of the time – almost always). 
Scores range from 0 – 63; higher scores reflect higher levels of symptomology. Relative to many 
other commonly used measures of anxiety and depression, the DASS has been shown to 
distinguish between symptoms of anxiety and depression with greater reliability (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). The DASS has demonstrated good psychometric properties in nonclinical 
samples, with internal consistency and concurrent validity scores ranging from acceptable to 
excellent (Antony et al., 1998; Henry & Crawford, 2005; Sinclair et al., 2012). Internal 
consistency in the present study was good for the depression (α = 0.87), anxiety (α = 0.81), and 
stress subscales (α = 0.80). 
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Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale– Self Report Version (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987).  The LSAS is 
a 48-item paper-and-pencil self-report instrument that instructs participants to rate the level of 
fear and avoidance they experience across a variety of social interactions and performance 
situations. This measure was used to assess the construct and criterion validity of the outcome 
probability bias task. Participants are instructed to rate their fear and avoidance using a Likert-
type scale ranging from 0 (none/never) to 3 (severe/usually). Scores range from 0 – 144. Higher 
scores indicate greater anxiety and avoidance. The LSAS has demonstrated high internal 
consistency and strong convergent and discriminant validity among a clinical sample of socially 
anxious individuals (α = .95) as well as among individuals without an Axis I disorder (α = .94). 
A total score of 60 or higher has been shown to be associated with clinical levels of symptoms of 
social anxiety disorder, generalized subtype (Mennin et al., 2002). Internal consistency in the 
present study was excellent (α = 0.96). 
2.3.3 Outcome Cost Questionnaire (OCQ; Uren et al., 2004) 
The OCQ is a 12-item paper-and-pencil questionnaire of people’s beliefs about the negative 
consequences of a socially threatening event. This measure was used to assess convergent 
validity of the outcome probability bias task in the present study. The OCQ asks participants to 
rate “how bad or distressing the following outcomes would be for you if they were to occur” on a 
scale of 0 (“not at all distressing”) to 8 (“extremely distressing”). Scores range from 0 – 96; 
higher scores reflect higher outcome cost bias. Internal consistency for the OCQ was excellent in 
the original scale development paper (α = 0.92–0.94; Uren et al. 2004) and in the present study (α 
= 0.93). 
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2.3.4 Outcome Probability Questionnaire (OPQ; Uren et al., 2004)  
The OPQ is a 12-item paper-and-pencil questionnaire that assesses an individual’s estimate 
of the probability that negative socially threatening events will occur. This measure was used to 
assess convergent validity of the outcome probability bias task in the present study. Items are 
scored on a nine-point Likert-type scale, with higher scores indicating higher outcome 
probability bias. Scores range from 0 – 96. Internal consistency for the measure has been found 
to range from good to excellent (α = .89 - .90; Uren et al., 2004). Internal consistency in the 
present study was excellent (α = 0.91). 
2.3.5 Subtle Avoidance Frequency Examination (SAFE; Cuming et al., 2009) 
The SAFE is a 19-item measure of safety behaviors among people with social anxiety. Safety 
behaviors are a subtle form of avoidance that people with anxiety often engage in during 
exposure to feared stimuli, such as avoiding eye-contact with audience members while giving a 
speech (Cuming et al., 2009). This measure was used to assess criterion validity of the outcome 
probability bias task in the present study. The SAFE instructs participants to rate how frequently 
they engaged in a number of safety behaviors during their speech (e.g. “blank out or switch off 
mentally”) on a five-point Likert-Type scale from “never” to “always.” Scores range from 19 – 
95 with higher scores reflecting engagement in more safety behaviors. The SAFE has 
demonstrated excellent psychometric properties in clinical and non-clinical samples (Cuming et 
al., 2009) and good internal consistency in the present study (α = 0.84). 
2.3.6 Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ; Kennedy et al., 1993) 
The SSQ is a 16-item measure of cybersickness. Cybersickness refers to common symptoms 
that may result from engaging with a virtual reality environment such as dizziness or blurred 
vision. This measure was used to assess the feasibility of the virtual reality BAT in the present 
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study. Participants rate the severity of symptoms on a four-point Likert-type scale from none to 
severe. Scores range from 16 – 64 with higher scores reflecting more symptoms of 
cybersickness. Internal consistency in the present study was good (α = 0.84). 
2.3.7 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-State Form (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1970)   
The STAI is a 20-item measure that assesses in-the-moment symptoms of general anxiety. 
This measure was used to assess the feasibility of the virtual reality BAT in the present study. 
Participants are instructed to rate their current anxiety using a four-point Likert-type scale, (1= 
not at all, 2= somewhat, 3= moderately so, and 4= very much so). Scores range from 20 – 80 
with higher scores reflecting higher state anxiety. The measure has demonstrated good 
psychometric properties, with internal consistency coefficients ranging from 0.86 to 0.95 
(Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983).  Internal consistency in the present study was excellent (α = 0.90 
- 0.92).  
2.3.8 Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1973) 
The SUDS is a self-report face-valid scale that is used to assess current distress or anxiety. A 
SUDS of 0 represents the absence of any distress or anxiety, 5 represents moderate distress or 
anxiety, and 10 represents the most distress or anxiety imaginable. SUDS ratings are commonly 
used during exposure therapy as well as during assessment (e. g., during a behavioral avoidance 
test; Kim et al., 2008; Wolpe & Lazarus, 1966).  In the present study, participants stated their 
SUDS at two-minute intervals throughout the BAT. SUDS were used to assess criterion validity 
of the outcome probability bias task. 
2.3.9 Temple Presence Inventory (TPI; Lombard et al., 2009)  
Participants’ experience of fear in response to the virtual environment has been shown to be 
related to presence, or the ability to feel connected to and engaged with virtual stimuli (Lee, 
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2004; Schubert et al., 2001; Witmer & Singer, 1998). The TPI is a 42-item multidimensional 
measure that assesses spatial presence, social presence, engagement, social richness, social 
realism, and perceptual realism. This measure was used to assess the feasibility of the virtual 
reality BAT in the present study. It has demonstrated good reliability, validity, and applicability 
across a wide range of media (Lombard et al., 2009). Participants rate the degree to which an 
item applied to their virtual experience from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  A subset of 20 items 
relevant to the present study were used. As such, scores ranged from 20 – 140. Internal 
consistency in the present study was excellent (α = 0.92). 
2.3.10 Word Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP; Beard & Amir, 2008) 
The WSAP is a computer task designed to measure interpretation bias in social anxiety. This 
measure was used to assess discriminant validity of the outcome probability bias task. 
Participants first see a fixation cross for 500ms, followed by a target word for 500ms. An 
ambiguous sentence appears (e.g., “people laugh after something you said”) and participants are 
instructed to press the spacebar as soon as they have read the sentence. Participants then see the 
prompt, “are they related?” Participants press “1” on the keypad if the word and sentence appear 
to be related, and “3” if they do not appear to be related. The task consists of 110 trials, 76 of 
which include social themes and 34 of which are non-social filler sentences (e.g., “a loud noise is 
heard at night”).  The target words that quickly flash on the screen prior to the ambiguous 
sentence can be interpreted as threatening (e.g., “embarrassing”) or benign (e.g., “funny”).  
Interpretation bias is calculated by self-report (the number of threat trials that received a response 
of “yes” to the relatedness prompt) or reaction times (mean reaction time to endorse relatedness 
of a threatening target word minus mean reaction time to reject relatedness of a threatening target 
word). Based on previous research, the WSAP has been shown to correlate with symptoms of 
33 
social anxiety and validly discriminated between socially anxious individuals and non-anxious 
controls (Beard & Amir, 2009). A review of 41 studies that used the WSAP indicated the task 
has good reliability and validity (Gonsalves et al., 2019). 
3 PILOT STUDY 
3.1 Participant Characteristics 
Participants’ (n = 60) mean age was 18.95 (range 18 - 22). The majority of the sample 
identified as female (n = 46, 77%). Thirteen identified as male (22%) and one identified as 
gender-fluid. Regarding sexual orientation, 45 participants identified as heterosexual (75%), 
eight identified as bisexual (13%), four as questioning (7%), two as gay (3%) and one as lesbian 
(2%). Twenty-four participants identified as African American/Black (40%), 14 as White (23%), 
11 as Asian American/Asian (18%), seven as Hispanic/Latinx (12%), three as multi-racial (5%), 
and one self-identified as Pacific Islander and White. Most reported the United States as their 
country of origin (n = 42, 70%). The remaining participants’ countries of origin included 
Canada, France, Pakistan, Nigeria, Antigua, Bangladesh, India, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, 
Vietnam, and South Korea. Most were single (n = 47, 78%), 12 reported being in a serious dating 
or committed relationship (20%), and one was in a civil union, domestic partnership, or 
equivalent. Many of the participants reported being Christian (n = 24, 40%), eight were agnostic 
(13%), eight stated no preference (13%), six were Muslim (10%), six stated “other,” including 
spiritual, general belief in God, Christian Buddhist, and Regla de Ocha, four Catholic (7%), two 
Atheist (3%), one Jewish, and one Hindu.  
3.2 Pilot Study Procedure 
This project was approved by the Georgia State University Institutional Review Board 
(H20007). Following completion of the informed consent, participants completed the pre-test 
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STAI, the outcome probability bias task, and the post-test STAI. Subsequently, participants 
completed a battery of questionnaires, including the LSAS, OPQ, OCQ, and the DASS. 
Participants also filled out a demographics questionnaire and a questionnaire designed to elicit 
participants’ feedback about the outcome probability task (included in Appendix B.9). This 
questionnaire included questions about the images (e.g. if participants were able to tell the race 
or gender of the blurry figures; which images, if any, induced the most anxiety), any strategies 
they may have used while completing the outcome probability bias task, and any general 
feedback they may have had. 
3.3 Pilot Study Results 
Power analyses using g*power indicated a minimum sample size of 24 was needed to detect 
a small effect for pilot study hypotheses. A conservative estimate was chosen given the outcome 
probability bias task is a new measure. Due to the iterative nature of the pilot process, data were 
collected from 60 participants. Changes made during completion of the pilot included adding 
confidence ratings to the automatic block and editing task instructions for clarity.  
Data from the outcome probability bias task were missing for two participants in the 
controlled block and eight participants in the automatic block due to programming error. 
Significant skew was detected in post-STAI scores and mean outcome probability bias task 
ratings. Notably, the F-statistic is considered to be robust with regard to violations of normality 
and homogeneity when group sizes are equal (Donaldson, 1968). In addition, linear regression 
analyses do not assume normal distribution of predictor variables (Field, 2013). As such, no 
corrections were made to present analyses due to skew. 
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3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 3.1 (overall) and Table 3.2 (separated by 
social anxiety symptom scores above and below the clinical cutoff of 60; Mennin et al., 2002). 
Table 3.1 Means and Standard Deviations for Measures Used in the Pilot Study 
 
Measure M (SD) 
Pre-STAI 35.22 (9.45) 
Post-STAI 39.57 (11.45) 
OPQ 56.10 (23.01) 
OCQ 64.22 (20.71) 
LSAS 67.28 (28.40) 
Social 1st (Controlled) 47.78 (16.64) 
Social 3rd (Controlled) 49.27 (19.37) 
Control (Controlled) 9.59 (10.67) 
Social 1st (Automatic) 59.90 (29.30) 
Social 3rd (Automatic) 50.74 (26.42) 
Control (Automatic) 8.58 (12.84) 
Note. STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, OPQ = Outcome Probability Questionnaire, 
OCQ = Outcome Cost Questionnaire, LSAS = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, Social 1st, 
Social 3rd, and Control measures all refer to mean outcome probability bias task ratings 
from 0 – 100%. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Means and Standard Deviations for Measures Used in the Pilot Study 
Separated by Social Anxiety Symptom Clinical Cutoff 
 
Measure Below LSAS Cutoff M (SD) 
n = 27 
Above LSAS Cutoff M (SD) 
n = 31 
Pre-STAI 31.04 (7.31) 38.88 (9.66) 
Post-STAI 34.93 (9.52) 43.63 (11.58) 
OPQ 39.00 (18.04) 71.06 (15.13) 
OCQ 51.32 (19.92) 75.50 (13.76) 
LSAS 45.14 (20.05) 86.66 (18.84) 
Social 1st (Controlled) 38.30 (17.72) 56.03 (10.15) 
Social 3rd (Controlled) 38.15 (20.03) 58.96 (12.52) 
Control (Controlled) 8.33 (9.00) 10.69 (11.99) 
Social 1st (Automatic) 49.49 (29.65) 69.23 (26.01) 
Social 3rd (Automatic) 38.68 (22.33) 61.25 (25.47) 
Control (Automatic) 7.27 (10.21) 9.71 (14.84) 
Note. STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, OPQ = Outcome Probability Questionnaire, 
OCQ = Outcome Cost Questionnaire, LSAS = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, Social 1st, 
Social 3rd, and Control measures all refer to mean outcome probability bias task ratings 
from 0 – 100%. 
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The distribution of means and standard deviations was consistent with expectations that 
outcome probability bias task ratings would be higher for social images compared to control 
images and for people who reported symptoms of social anxiety above the clinical cutoff relative 
to those who reported symptoms below the clinical cutoff.  
Zero-order correlations are reported in Table 3.3. Zero-order correlations were also 
consistent with expectations. Social images from the outcome probability bias task were 
positively and significantly correlated with paper-and-pencil measures of symptoms of social 
anxiety (LSAS), outcome probability bias (OPQ), and outcome cost bias (OCQ). Correlations 
were strong for the controlled block and moderate for the automatic block.  
Table 3.3 Zero-order Correlations Among Blocks of the Outcome Probability Task and 
Paper-and-pencil Measures of State Anxiety, Outcome Probability Bias, Outcome Cost 














Pre-STAI 1          
Post-STAI .74* 1         
OPQ .54* .56* 1        
OCQ .45* .35* .70* 1       
LSAS .56* .52* .72* .68* 1      
Social 1st 
(Controlled) 
.48* .50* .62* .50* .60* 1     
Social 3rd 
(Controlled) 
.51* .50* .61* .51* .68* .90* 1    
Control 
(Controlled) 





.44* .33* .39* .53* .56* -.03 1  
Social 3rd 
(Automatic) 
.17 .30* .45* .33* .44* .66* .65* .14 .81* 1 
Control 
(Automatic) 
.01 .17 .24 .14 .14 .15 .15 .40* -.01 .22 
Note. STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, OPQ = Outcome Probability Questionnaire, 
OCQ = Outcome Cost Questionnaire, LSAS = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, Social 1st, 
Social 3rd, and Control measures all refer to mean outcome probability bias task ratings 
from 0 – 100%. 
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3.3.2 Feasibility of Stimuli 
Feasibility of task stimuli was evaluated by assessing internal consistency among the images, 
analysis of hypotheses 1 – 4, and anecdotal feedback from participants.  
3.3.2.1 Internal Consistency 
Internal consistency was evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha. Internal consistency was 
excellent for all stimulus types in the controlled block (α = 0.94, 0.96, and 0.91 for social 1st, 
social 3rd, and control images, respectively). Internal consistency was good for social 1st images 
(α = 0.89), acceptable for social 3rd images (α = 0.79), and poor for control images (α = 0.58) in 
the automatic block. Alpha-if-item-deleted scores indicated that removal of the control trial 
depicting different objects (e.g. coffee cup, padlock, etc.) would improve internal consistency to 
the questionable range (α = 0.67). All images demonstrated a correlation greater than r = 0.30 
with the mean score for a given stimulus type in both blocks, with one exception (r = 0.29), and 
were therefore retained.  
3.3.2.2 Quantitative Analyses 
Hypothesis 1: A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with a within-subjects factor of time (pre- 
and post-STAI) and a between-subjects factor of symptoms of social anxiety (above or below the 
clinical cutoff on the LSAS) was used to evaluate the hypothesis that state anxiety would 
increase following completion of the outcome probability bias task for all participants. The 
analysis revealed significant main effects of time (F (1, 58) = 18.26, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.24) 
and symptoms (F (1, 58) = 12.92, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.18). State anxiety significantly 
increased from pre- to post-outcome probability bias task. State anxiety scores were significantly 
higher for those with social anxiety symptom scores above the clinical cutoff relative to those 
with scores below the clinical cutoff. The interaction was not significant (p < 0.05).  
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Hypothesis 2: A series of one-way ANOVA analyses were conducted to evaluate the 
hypothesis that social images would elicit significantly higher outcome probability bias task 
ratings relative to control images. In both analyses, the assumption of sphericity was violated so 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values are reported. A priori repeated contrasts were used to 
evaluate differences in outcome probability bias task ratings among the three stimulus types. 
These contrasts compared social 1st images to social 3rd images and social 3rd images to control 
images. Social 1st and control images were not compared using this method.  
The model was significant for the controlled block, indicating a significant difference in 
mean outcome probability bias task ratings among the three stimulus types: F (2, 72.58) = 
225.25, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.80. Repeated contrasts indicated that ratings in response to social 
1st and social 3rd images did not differ significantly (p < 0.05). Outcome probability bias task 
ratings in response to social 3rd images were significantly higher relative to ratings in response to 
control images (F (1, 57) = 222.55, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.80). Results are depicted in Figure 
3.1. 
The model was also significant for the automatic block, reflecting a significant difference in 
mean outcome probability bias task ratings among the three stimulus types: F (2, 82.36) = 
127.21, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.69. Repeated contrasts revealed responses to social 1st images 
were significantly greater than responses to social 3rd images (F (1,57) = 16.12, p < 0.01, partial 
η2 = 0.22. Responses to social 3rd images were significantly greater than responses to control 
images (F (1,57) = 144.31, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.72 (see Figure 3.2). 
Results from both of these analyses were consistent with the hypothesis that outcome 




Figure 3.1 Mean Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings for Social 1st, Social 3rd, and 
Control Images in the Controlled Block During the Pilot Study 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Mean Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings for Social 1st, Social 3rd, and 
Control Images in the Automatic Block During the Pilot Study 
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Hypothesis 3: A one-way ANOVA analysis with a between-subjects factor of symptoms of 
social anxiety (above or below the clinical cutoff on the LSAS) and outcome probability bias 
task stimuli entered as the dependent variables was used to test the hypothesis that ratings for 
social images would be higher for those reporting symptoms of social anxiety above the clinical 
cutoff (60; Mennin et al., 2012). Consistent with the hypothesis, outcome probability bias task 
ratings in response to all social images were significantly higher among those reporting higher 
levels of social anxiety relative to those reporting lower levels of social anxiety (Social 1st 
(controlled): F (1, 57) = 22.56, p < 0.01; Social 3rd (controlled): F (1, 57) = 23.12, p < 0.01; 
Social 1st (automatic): F (1, 57) = 7.52, p < 0.01; Social 3rd (automatic): F (1, 57) = 12.69, p < 
0.01). Ratings did not significantly differ by group in response to control images (all p values > 
0.05). 
Hypothesis 4: A series of regression analyses were used to test the hypothesis that social 
images would significantly predict responses to paper-and-pencil measures of outcome 
probability bias and symptoms of social anxiety, but control images would not. Paper-and-pencil 
measures of outcome probability bias (OPQ) and symptoms of social anxiety (LSAS) were 
entered as dependent variables and social and control images from the controlled and automatic 
blocks of the outcome probability bias task served as the predictor variables. Social images were 
collapsed across stimulus type (social 1st and social 3rd) due to the high degree of correlation 
between them, which could contribute to problems with multicollinearity (Field, 2013). All 
regression models were significant (all p values < 0.01). The controlled and automatic blocks of 
the outcome probability bias task accounted for 40% and 25% of the variability in the OPQ and 
45% and 20% of the variability in the LSAS, respectively. Across analyses, social images were 
identified as significant predictors and control images were nonsignificant (see Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.4 Results from Regression Analyses of the Outcome Probability Bias Task with Paper-
and-pencil Measures of Outcome Probability Bias and Symptoms of Social Anxiety in the Pilot 
Study 
 
DV Predictor Model β P 95% CI 
OPQ Controlled Block F (2, 57) = 
18.36, p < 0.01 
   
Social Images  0.79 <0.01 0.52 – 1.07 
Control Images  0.06 0.60 -0.34 – 0.58 
Automatic Block F (2,57) = 9.28, 
p < 0.01 
   
Social Images  0.38 <0.01 0.18 – 0.58 
Control Images  0.34 0.11 -0.08 – 0.75 
LSAS Controlled Block F (2, 57) = 
14.44, p < 0.01 
   
Social Images  0.98 <0.01 0.30 – 1.65 
Control Images  0.32 0.26 -0.25 – 0.89 
Automatic Block F (2, 57) = 6.64, 
p < 0.01 
   
Social Images  0.42 <0.01 0.19 – 0.72 
Control Images  0.21 0.44 -0.33 – 0.76 
 
3.3.2.3 Feedback Survey 
Fifty-four participants (90%) indicated they had little or no difficulty imagining themselves 
in the social situations depicted in the outcome probability bias task images. Thirty-six 
participants (60%) gave some indication that they could determine the race, age, or gender of the 
blurry figures. Generally, participants indicated they could guess the gender in some of the 
images. For example, one participant stated, “sometimes I could tell the gender of the blurred 
figures based on the shape of the silhouette.” Another participant indicated, “just gender, 
occasionally,” though others indicated they could also sometimes tell the age or race of the 
figure. Many participants indicated they could not tell, with one participant stating, “no, because 
I was only imagining it being me.” 
A total of 41 participants (68%) indicated that some of the images made them feel anxious. 
Feedback about which images induced the most anxiety supported the face validity of the task. 
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Among participants who indicated the images made them feel anxious, many participants stated 
the images with public speaking (n = 20) and interviews (n = 11) were particularly anxiety 
provoking. Images with disapproving facial expressions (mad, judgmental, bored), direct eye 
contact, and close-up images of faces were also frequently endorsed (n = 15). Other descriptions 
of anxiety provoking images were typically consistent with items on the paper-and-pencil 
measure of symptoms of social anxiety (LSAS) including talking to someone in authority or 
parties. One response also emphasized the race and age of the people in the image: “meeting 
with powerful white men who were older than me.”  
When asked “what were you afraid might happen in response to the images that made you 
feel anxious?” participants indicated that their “mind would go blank,” that they would be 
negatively judged or mocked, they would be embarrassed, they would fail in some way (e.g. not 
achieve their goals), be punished, or they would be ostracized. Some also indicated concern 
about their emotional experience as a result (feeling anxiety, feeling jittery, or feeling regret). 
Images that tended to be least likely to provoke anxiety included those of plants, buildings, and 
objects. Some also indicated that images of parties or showing people having fun and smiling did 
not induce anxiety. 
Most participants indicated they didn’t use any strategies while completing the outcome 
probability bias task. Among those who did endorse a strategy, one participant reported they 
would “zone out and focus on the image until it comes to life.” Another indicated they would 
“try to really think about what was about to happen.” 
When asked for general feedback, many reported enjoying the task, stating they were 
engaged throughout or that the images were relatable. For example, one participant stated, “the 
images were well placed and not hard to picture yourself in.” Another said, “[the images] were 
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all easy to focus on and understand the situation pictured.” Others described how the images 
elicited anxiety, including some who stated they realized the extent of their social anxiety as a 
result of participating in the task. For example, one participant noted that the images “made me 
physically feel very anxious” and another shared that “they just showed me that I might actually 
have anxiety.” Others noted that the images didn’t have much of an emotional impact on them: 
“overall none of the images caused me stress or made me feel uncomfortable.” Finally, some 
participants expressed confusion surrounding inclusion of the control items, stating they “didn't 
understand why inanimate objects make you feel embarrassed or judged.” 
3.3.3 Feasibility of Stimulus Duration in Automatic Block 
Assessment of the feasibility of the stimulus duration in the automatic block involved 
evaluating the degree to which responses may have been influenced by automatic or controlled 
processing. This was assessed by examination of accuracy and confidence ratings and anecdotal 
feedback.  
3.3.3.1 Accuracy and Confidence Ratings  
In the automatic task, participants completed comprehension questions about the images they 
just saw. They also rated how confident they were in their response to the comprehension 
question. Participants’ responses to comprehension items were highly accurate, with a mean 
accuracy rate of 8.11 out of nine questions (n = 50). High accuracy (above the level of chance) 
indicates there may have been opportunity for controlled processing to take place when 
participants rated the images in the automatic task. The average confidence rating was 2.27 out 
of 4 (n = 18; confidence ratings were added towards the end of data collection in the pilot study). 
Lower ratings reflected less confidence. 
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3.3.3.2 Anecdotal Feedback 
When asked if the participants were able to tell what the images were showing during the 
automatic block, 23 (38%) indicated they could discern nearly all of the images; the remaining 
37 participants (62%) indicated they could tell what was shown some of the time. Some 
participants indicated they could remember at least one of the images (often the first or the last 
image) and used this to influence their responses to the comprehension questions: “[my ratings 
were] based off the freshest picture in my memory.” Another participant said “if I didn't know, I 
just focused on finding one picture specifically and answering the question based off of that 
singular picture.” Because a substantial proportion of participants stated they could tell what the 
images were showing for nearly all images, controlled processing could have impacted 
responding during the automatic block, particularly if participants took time to consider their 
response before submitting their outcome probability rating.  
3.3.4 Role of the Availability Heuristic in Outcome Probability Bias 
I hypothesized that outcome probability bias task ratings would be higher for participants 
who completed the controlled block first due to increased familiarity with the images. 
Participants who completed the controlled block first viewed and rated the same images when 
they completed the automatic block (and were therefore familiar with the images). Participants 
who completed the automatic block first were seeing the images for the first time (and were 
therefore not familiar with the images).  Familiarity exacerbates the availability heuristic at an 
automatic level of processing (Menon & Raghubir, 2003; Kahneman, 2011). As such, higher 
outcome probability bias task ratings during the automatic block among participants who were 
familiar with the images (participants who completed the controlled block first) relative to those 
who were unfamiliar with the images (participants who completed the automatic block first) 
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could support Butler and Mathews’ (1983) hypothesis that outcome probability bias results from 
the availability heuristic.  
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the effect of block order on mean outcome 
probability bias task ratings in the automatic block. Consistent with the hypothesis, block order 
had a significant effect on mean outcome probability bias task ratings in response to social 
images (F (1, 57) = 4.71, p = 0.03), such that mean ratings were significantly higher if 
participants completed the controlled block first (and were familiar with the images; M = 62.64) 
compared to participants who completed the automatic block first (and were unfamiliar with the 
images; M = 48.00). 
3.4 Pilot Discussion 
The pattern of results indicated that the images included in the task were appropriate. Internal 
consistency ranged from acceptable to high for all social images (α = 0.79 - 0.96), hypotheses 1 – 
4 were supported in quantitative analyses, and anecdotal feedback indicated that the task images 
were evocative and relatable. The controlled block was retained for the main study with no 
alterations, but, as explained below, changes were made to the automatic block.  
To further limit the degree to which controlled processing could influence responding during 
the automatic block, the number of images included in the automatic trials was reduced from five 
to three for the main study. Accuracy ratings were high (well above the level of chance) in 
response to comprehension questions following automatic trials during the pilot, indicating there 
was potential for participants to engage in controlled processing. Inclusion of five images (all 
depicting the same social situation) of 67ms each (335ms total) likely allowed sufficient time for 
controlled processing to take place. Reducing the number of images within each trial for the 
main study shortened the total amount of time participants were exposed to the stimuli, thus 
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limiting the potential for controlled processing to occur. In addition to reducing the number of 
images, the automatic block task instructions were amended to emphasize that participants 
should give their outcome probability ratings as quickly as possible to further minimize 
opportunity for controlled processing.  
I also removed social 3rd images from the automatic block. Outcome probability bias task 
ratings were significantly higher for social 1st images relative to social 3rd images, potentially 
because social 3rd images are not conducive to automatic processing. Controlled processing is 
required to insert oneself into a blurry figure. Given the short duration of the stimulus 
presentation (67ms), participants may not have noticed the presence of the blurry figure in the 
image.  
Social 3rd images were replaced with novel images that were not included in the controlled 
block to clarify the nature of the order effect detected in the automatic block ratings. Participants 
who completed the controlled block first had higher outcome probability bias task ratings in 
response to automatic trials. This order effect could be due to greater familiarity with the images 
because participants who completed the controlled block first would have previously seen the 
same images once before and were therefore more familiar with the images than participants who 
completed the automatic block first. Research indicates that familiarity can promote engagement 
with the availability heuristic at an automatic level of processing (Kahneman, 2011). Given that 
outcome probability bias has been hypothesized to result from the availability heuristic (Butler & 
Mathews, 1983), familiarity should also promote engagement of outcome probability bias. As 
such, higher outcome probability bias task ratings among participants who completed the 
controlled block first is consistent with Butler and Mathews’ (1983) claim. An alternative 
interpretation for order effects is that outcome probability bias task ratings were higher among 
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those who completed the controlled block first because of demand bias. Participants were aware 
the study was about social anxiety and may have had sufficient exposure to the task to infer that 
social items should be rated higher and responded accordingly. In order to evaluate whether this 
order effect was due to familiarity or demand bias, new social 1st images were added to the 
automatic block in the main study. These new images depicted the same social situations as the 
familiar images but were not included in the controlled block and would therefore be unfamiliar 
to all participants. Presence of an order effect for familiar, but not novel social images would rule 
out the interpretation that demand bias contributed to higher ratings among those who completed 
the controlled block first. 
4 MAIN STUDY 
4.1 Participant Characteristics 
Participants’ (n = 148) mean age was 20.61 (range 18-47). The majority of participants 
identified as women (n = 101, 68%). Forty-six identified as men (31%) and one identified as 
other and did not specify. Regarding sexual orientation, 118 participants identified as 
heterosexual (80%), thirteen identified as bisexual (9%), seven as questioning (5%), seven as gay 
(5%) and two as pansexual (1%). Seventy participants identified as African American/Black 
(47%), 25 as White (17%), 23 as Asian American/Asian (16%), 15 as Hispanic/Latinx (10%), 10 
as multi-racial (7%), two as Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (1%) and two as American 
Indian or Alaska Native (1%). The majority reported the United States is their country of origin 
(n = 91, 62%). Most were single (n = 96, 65%), 45 reported being in a serious dating or 
committed relationship (30%), four were married (3%), one was separated, one was divorced, 
and one was in a civil union, domestic partnership, or equivalent. Only six of the participants 
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were international students (4%). Many of the participants were freshman (n = 65, 44%). None 
reported any physical disabilities.   
4.2 Main Study Procedure 
This project was approved by the Georgia State University Institutional Review Board 
(H20200). This study was pre-registered through the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/fr8zv). Results from the pilot study were used to influence the design of the 
outcome probability bias task. No changes were made to the controlled block. Changes to the 
automatic block were intended to reduce opportunities for controlled processing and included a 
reduction in the number of images presented in each trial (from five to three), removal of a 
control trial that negatively impacted internal consistency, removal of trials using social 3rd 
images, and inclusion of new trials containing novel images that were not also included in the 
controlled block. New images added to the automatic block were consistent in content with 
familiar images, which were also present in the controlled block (i.e. public speaking, interviews, 
threatening faces). In addition, comprehension question items were altered so correct responses 
were specific to the second image presented in the automatic trials, and the instructions were 
modified to specify that participants should submit their ratings on the visual analogue scale as 
quickly as possible. 
The procedure for the main study differed from the procedure used for the pilot study. After 
signing the informed consent, participants completed the outcome probability bias task followed 
by a virtual reality behavioral avoidance test. Participants then completed a measure of state 
anxiety (STAI) and rated their performance while standing to maintain physiological arousal. 
Subsequently, participants completed a battery of questionnaires on the computer including 
measures of cybersickness (SSQ), presence (TPI), safety-behaviors (SAFE), outcome probability 
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bias (OPQ), outcome cost bias (OCQ), symptoms of social anxiety (LSAS), symptoms of 
depression, anxiety, and stress (DASS), exploratory measures of stereotype confirmation 
concerns and mindfulness, a demographics questionnaire, and an exploratory measure of post-
event processing. Finally, participants completed the WSAP interpretation bias computer task.  
4.3 Main Study Results 
Power analyses using g*power indicated a minimum sample size of 67 was needed to detect 
a small effect for hypotheses related to convergent, discriminant, construct, and criterion validity. 
A minimum sample size of 200 is recommended to conduct an exploratory factor analysis 
(Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999). Data collected from the main study (n = 
148) were combined with data from the pilot study (n = 55; 5 participants completed both 
studies) when possible to ensure adequate power (outcome probability bias task controlled block, 
OPQ, OCQ, and LSAS), including for the exploratory factor analysis of the controlled block 
from the outcome probability bias task. Research shows that the sample size needed to achieve a 
point of stability for correlations of 0.5 and power level of 0.80 is n = 143 (Schönbrodt and 
Perugini, 2013), which further increased confidence that the study was adequately powered. 
4.3.1 Missing Data Strategy 
Missing data can lead to significant loss of information that could potentially influence the 
sensitivity of statistical tests (Gold & Bentler, 2000). Little’s (1988) MCAR test indicated that 
missing data were likely missing completely at random for all self-report measures included in 
the present analyses. Expectation maximization was used to replace missing values with 
predicted values. Expectation maximization has been shown to be advantageous in a Monte-
Carlo examination of different approaches to estimating missing data (Gold & Bentler, 2000). 
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For the interpretation bias task (WSAP), reaction times shorter than 50ms or longer than 
2,000ms were removed, consistent with the original task development paper (Beard & Amir, 
2009). No other outliers were identified in the dataset. Assumptions of normality were evaluated 
using P-P plots, histograms, and scatterplots of residuals (Field, 2013). All assumptions were met 
with two exceptions. Positive skew and platykurtosis were detected for outcome probability bias 
task control images, which was not surprising because most participants tended to rate little to no 
likelihood of negative judgment, embarrassment, or humiliation in response to nonsocial images. 
In addition, platykurtosis and negative skew were detected for BAT speech length. 
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Overall means and standard deviations for all primary measures are reported in Table 4.1. 
Means and standard deviations for all measures separated by social anxiety symptom scores 
above and below a clinical cutoff score (60; Mennin et al., 2012) are reported in Table 4.2. 
Outcome probability bias task ratings were higher for social images relative to control images 
and among participants with social anxiety symptom scores above a clinical cutoff relative to 
those with scores below the clinical cutoff. The mean social anxiety symptom score on the LSAS 
was just below the clinical cutoff for all participants. Overall mean depression, anxiety, and 
stress scores on the DASS fell in the mild, moderate, and mild ranges, respectively. Symptoms of 
general anxiety (DASS) fell in the severe range for participants with social anxiety symptom 
scores above the clinical cutoff and the mild range for participants with scores below the clinical 
cutoff. Zero-order correlations among measures included in validity analyses are reported in 
Table 4.3. Correlations were consistent with expectations with two exceptions. The outcome 
probability bias task was not significantly related to behavioral avoidance (BAT) and only social 
1st images from the controlled block significantly correlated with interpretation bias (WSAP). 
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Table 4.1 Means and Standard Deviations for Measures in the Main Study 
 
Measure M (SD) 
Social 1st (Controlled) 43.61 (18.59) 
Social 3rd (Controlled) 45.18 (20.98) 
Control (Controlled) 7.72 (9.46) 
Social (Automatic) 53.30 (26.34) 
Control (Automatic) 9.53 (18.74) 
OPQ 47.78 (23.06) 
OCQ 56.57 (24.56) 
LSAS 58.00 (27.59) 
SAFE 46.62 (10.55) 
DASS Stress 15.00 (8.59) 
DASS Anxiety 11.26 (8.77) 
DASS Depression 10.87 (8.94) 
STAI 46.19 (14.23) 
BAT Speech Length (s) 349.86 (233.10) 
Peak SUDS 6.61 (2.63) 
WSAP Threat Endorse 23.58 (6.75) 
WSAP Benign Endorse 25.71 (5.85) 
WSAP Threat Bias (RT) 44.75 (139.74) 
WSAP Benign Bias (RT) -77.28 (148.92) 
Note. Social 1st, Social 3rd, Social, and Control measures all refer to mean outcome 
probability bias task ratings from 0 – 100%. OPQ = Outcome Probability Questionnaire, 
OCQ = Outcome Cost Questionnaire, LSAS = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, SAFE = 
Subtle Avoidance Frequency Examination, DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scale, 
STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, BAT = Behavioral Avoidance Test,  SUDS = 










Table 4.2 Means and Standard Deviations Separated by Self-Report Social Anxiety 
Symptom Clinical Cutoff for Measures in the Main Study 
 
Measure Below LSAS Cutoff M (SD) 
n = 86 
Above LSAS Cutoff M (SD) 
n = 62 
Social 1st (Controlled) 34.63 (18.41) 52.01 (14.47) 
Social 3rd (Controlled) 35.33 (19.84) 54.85 (17.57) 
Control (Controlled) 6.07 (8.74) 8.13 (8.68) 
Social (Automatic) 45.35 (27.18) 64.32 (20.73) 
Control (Automatic) 5.94 (13.79) 14.52 (23.19) 
OPQ 36.49 (20.52) 55.40 (20.01) 
OCQ 45.36 (25.44) 65.92 (20.03) 
LSAS 36.59 (15.48) 80.10 (15.28) 
SAFE 44.38 (10.48) 49.72 (9.91) 
DASS Stress 12.23 (7.72) 18.84 (8.30) 
DASS Anxiety 8.12 (6.17) 15.61 (9.96) 
DASS Depression 8.00 (7.19) 14.84 (9.64) 
STAI 40.85 (11.61) 53.60 (14.29) 
BAT Speech Length (s) 368.56 (228.09) 323.94 (239.31) 
Peak SUDS 5.64 (2.5) 7.95 (2.14) 
WSAP Threat Endorse 23.05 (6.63) 24.33 (6.89) 
WSAP Benign Endorse 26.03 (5.25) 25.26 (6.62) 
WSAP Threat Bias (RT) 38.31 (145.51) 54.13 (131.55) 
WSAP Benign Bias (RT) -78.78 (146.54) -75.14 (153.48) 
Note. Social 1st, Social 3rd, Social, and Control measures all refer to mean outcome 
probability bias task ratings from 0 – 100%. OPQ = Outcome Probability Questionnaire, 
OCQ = Outcome Cost Questionnaire, LSAS = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, SAFE = 
Subtle Avoidance Frequency Examination, DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scale, 
STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, BAT = Behavioral Avoidance Test,  SUDS = 






















4.3.3 Reliability: Internal Consistency 
Internal consistency for the controlled block was excellent for social 1st (α = 0.95) and social 
3rd images (α = 0.96), and good for control images (α = 0.89). For the automatic block, internal 
consistency was good for the social images (α = 0.86) and the control images (α = 0.82). 
4.3.4 Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
Table 4.3 Zero-Order Correlations Among Blocks of the Outcome Probability Task and 
Paper-and-pencil Measures of Outcome Probability Bias, Outcome Cost Bias, Social 
Anxiety Symptoms, Safety Behaviors, Depression, Stress, an Interpretation Bias Task, 

































1            
Social 
3rd (Ctrl) 
.89* 1           
Control 
(Ctrl) 
.34* .26* 1          
Social 
(Auto) 
.63* .60* .20* 1         
Control 
(Auto) 
.29* .31* .37* .20* 1        
OPQ .46* .48* .13 .33* .00 1       
OCQ .42* .45* .05 .29* -.03 .66* 1      
LSAS .58* .62* .20* .41* .24* .59* .56* 1     
SAFE .41* .43* .11 .28* .17* .51* .42* .40* 1    
DASS 
Stress 














-.09 -.13 -.04 .00 -.07 -.16 -.08 -.21* -.28* -.15 -.05 -.17* 
Note. Statistically significant correlations (p < 0.05) are designated with an asterisk. 
Social 1st, Social 3rd, Social, and Control measures all refer to mean outcome probability 
bias task ratings from 0 – 100%. Ctrl = Controlled block, Auto = Automatic block, OPQ 
= Outcome Probability Questionnaire, OCQ = Outcome Cost Questionnaire, LSAS = 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, SAFE = Subtle Avoidance Frequency Examination, 
DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scale, WSAP = Word Sentence Association 
Paradigm, RT = reaction time, BAT = Behavioral Avoidance Test. 
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The pattern of correlations was consistent with hypotheses of convergent and discriminant 
validity. Social items on the outcome probability bias task demonstrated moderate positive 
correlations with paper-and-pencil measures of outcome probability and cost biases for the 
controlled block (r = 0.42 – 0.48). Correlations were weak to moderate for the automatic block (r 
= 0.29 – 0.33). Weaker correlations were detected with paper-and-pencil measures of depression 
and stress for the controlled block (r = 0.28 - 0.36) and the automatic block (r = 0.18 – 0.21).  
4.3.5 Construct Validity 
Construct validity was evaluated by exploring differences in outcome probability bias task 
ratings based on stimulus type, social anxiety symptoms above and below the clinical cutoff (60; 
Mennin et al., 2012), and the order in which participants completed the automatic and controlled 
blocks. To demonstrate construct validity, I hypothesized that both blocks of the outcome 
probability bias task would show significantly higher mean ratings for social images relative to 
control images. I also hypothesized that mean outcome probability bias task ratings would be 
higher among people with social anxiety symptoms above the clinical cutoff relative to those 
with scores below the clinical cutoff. For the automatic block, I hypothesized outcome 
probability bias task ratings would be higher among people who completed the automatic block 
after completing the controlled block, particularly for familiar images. 
4.3.5.1 Controlled Block 
A 3 (image type: social 1st, social 3rd, control) x 2 (social anxiety symptom score above or 
below the clinical cutoff) x 2 (block order: automatic first, controlled first) mixed-design 
ANOVA was conducted to assess construct validity of the controlled block. The assumption of 
sphericity was violated so Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values are reported for within-subjects 
variables (image type). Consistent with hypotheses and replicating results from the pilot study, 
55 
main effects of image type (F (1.45, 209.04) = 578.91, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.80) and social 
anxiety symptoms (F (1, 144) = 39.91, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.22) were significant. Regarding 
the main effect of image type, Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed significantly 
higher outcome probability bias task ratings in response to both social 1st and social 3rd images 
when compared to control images (M differences = 36.24 and 38.00, respectively, both p values 
< 0.01). There was no significant difference between social 1st and social 3rd images (M 
difference = 1.76, p > 0.05). Regarding the main effect of social anxiety symptoms, outcome 
probability bias task ratings were significantly higher among those with symptoms above the 
clinical cutoff relative to those below the clinical cutoff. There was also a significant main effect 
of block order (F (1, 144) = 16.54, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.10) such that outcome probability bias 
task ratings were higher among those who completed the automatic block first.  
These main effects were qualified by significant interactions between image type and block 
order (F (2, 144) = 7.00, p < 0.01, partial η2 = .05; see Figure 4.1) and between image type and 
social anxiety symptom score (F (2, 144) = 27.05, p < 0.01, partial η2 = .16; see Figure 4.2). 
There was not a significant interaction between social anxiety symptom score and block order (p 
> 0.05) and the three-way interaction was nonsignificant (p > 0.05).  These interaction effects 
reflected that higher outcome probability bias task ratings among participants who completed the 
automatic block first and with symptoms of social anxiety above the clinical cutoff were specific 
to social images (image type x block order: F (1, 144) = 8.61, p < 0.01, partial η2 = .06; image 
type x social anxiety symptom score: F (1, 144) = 30.74, p < 0.01, partial η2 = .18). Evidence that 
outcome probability bias ratings were higher among people with symptoms of social anxiety 
above the clinical cutoff for social images, but not control images was consistent with our 
hypotheses and supports the construct validity of the outcome probability bias task.  
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An order effect was unexpected for the controlled block. The fact that the interaction 
between block order and social anxiety symptom score was nonsignificant indicates the number 
of people with higher scores was not greater in one block order compared to the other. As such, 
people who completed the automatic block first may have given higher ratings due to priming or 
demand characteristics. 
 
Figure 4.1 Main Study Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings by Image Type and Block 
Order in the Controlled Block Collapsing Across Social Anxiety Symptom Score 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Main Study Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings by Image Type and Social 
Anxiety Symptom Score in the Controlled Block Collapsing Across Block Order 
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4.3.5.2 Automatic Block 
Assessment of participants’ assigned block order was particularly relevant for evaluation of 
construct validity of the automatic block because it allowed for evaluation of Butler and 
Mathews’ (1983) hypothesis that outcome probability bias results from the availability heuristic. 
I expected to replicate findings from the pilot study: mean outcome probability bias task ratings 
were higher among participants who completed the controlled block first. Novel images that 
were not present in the controlled block were added to the automatic block for the main study. I 
hypothesized that higher outcome probability bias task ratings in response to familiar images 
relative to novel images would support the interpretation that the order effect was due to the 
availability heuristic, which can result from familiarity, rather than demand bias. 
A 3 (image type: novel, familiar, control) x 2 (block order: automatic first, controlled first) x 
2 (social anxiety symptom score above or below the clinical cutoff) mixed-design ANOVA was 
used to test the hypothesis that outcome probability bias task ratings would be higher for social 
images relative to nonsocial images and among people with social anxiety symptom scores 
above the clinical cutoff relative to those with social anxiety symptom scores below the clinical 
cutoff. Image types included social images that were also presented in the controlled block (auto 
familiar), social images that were only included in the automatic block (auto novel), and control 
images. All social images elicited a 1st person perspective. The assumption of sphericity was 
violated so Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values are reported for within-subjects variables 
(image type). Consistent with the hypothesis and with results from the pilot study as well as the 
controlled block in the main study, there were significant main effects of image type (F (1.42, 
204.33) = 321.35, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.69) and social anxiety symptom score (F (1, 144) = 
26.04, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.15). In contrast, and inconsistent with our hypothesis, the main 
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effect of block order was not significant (p > 0.05). Regarding the main effect of image type, 
Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed significantly higher outcome probability 
bias task ratings in response to both novel and familiar social images when compared to control 
images (M differences = 41.77 and 48.01, respectively, both p values < 0.01). The difference 
between novel and familiar social images was also significant (M difference = 6.24, p > 0.05). 
Mean outcome probability bias task ratings were higher for auto familiar images compared to 
auto new images. Regarding the main effect of social anxiety symptom score, outcome 
probability bias task ratings were significantly higher among those with symptoms of social 
anxiety above the clinical cutoff. 
These main effects were qualified by significant interactions between image type and social 
anxiety symptom score (F (1.42, 204.33) = 5.27, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.04) and between image 
type and block order (F (1.42, 204.33) = 13.70, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.09). The interaction 
between block order and social anxiety symptom score was not significant, nor was the three-
way interaction (p values > 0.05). Regarding the interaction between image type and block order, 
outcome probability bias task ratings were significantly higher among participants with 
symptoms of social anxiety above the clinical cutoff for social images, specifically (F (1, 144) = 
5.37, p = 0.02, partial η2 = 0.04; see Figure 4.3). Regarding the interaction between image type 
and block order, those who completed the controlled block first reported higher outcome 
probability bias task ratings relative to those who completed the automatic block first, but only 
for social images (see Figure 4.4). This interaction effect was consistent with the order effect 
detected in the pilot study. 
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Figure 4.3 Main Study Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings by Image Type and Block 
Order for the Automatic Block Collapsing Across Social Anxiety Symptom Score 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Main Study Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings by Image Type and Social 
Anxiety Symptom Score for the Automatic Block Collapsing Across Block Order 
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A follow-up one-way ANOVA revealed no significant difference in outcome probability bias 
task ratings for novel images based on block order (F (1, 147) = 1.27, p = 0.26, partial η2 = 0.01). 
Although outcome probability bias task ratings for familiar images were higher among those 
who completed the controlled block first relative to those who completed the automatic block 
first, the difference was not statistically significant (F (1, 147) = 3.09, p = 0.08, partial η2 = 0.02). 
Accuracy and confidence ratings were also examined to evaluate if the automatic block 
elicited a greater degree of automatic processing relative to controlled processing. The average 
number of accurate responses to comprehension questions was 4.69 out of eight (SD = 1.15), 
which is just above the level of chance, supporting a high degree of automatic processing and a 
minimum of controlled processing. The average confidence rating was 1.85 out of four (SD = 
0.36). Low ratings reflect low confidence in the accuracy of responses to comprehension 
questions about the automatic trials and also support the high degree of influence of automatic 
processing on responses.  
4.3.6 Criterion Validity 
A series of multiple regression analyses were used to test the hypothesis that social items 
from the outcome probability bias task would be associated with self-reported symptoms of 
social anxiety, self-reported safety behaviors during the virtual reality speech task (BAT), 
duration of the speech, and peak subjective units of distress during the speech. Manipulation 
checks were implemented to assess the virtual reality speech task’s ability to induce state 
anxiety.  
4.3.6.1 Manipulation Checks for the Virtual Reality Behavioral Avoidance Test 
All participants completed self-report measures of state anxiety (STAI), presence (TPI) and 
cybersickness (SSQ). I expected participants with symptoms of social anxiety above the clinical 
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cutoff would report higher state anxiety following the virtual reality speech task relative to those 
with symptoms of social anxiety below the clinical cutoff.  
Due to unequal sample sizes, a Mann-Whitney U analysis was used to evaluate post-speech 
state anxiety among those with social anxiety symptom scores above and below the clinical 
cutoff. The analysis was significant (p < 0.01), indicating state anxiety was significantly higher 
after the virtual reality speech task among participants with high social anxiety relative to those 
with low social anxiety.  
Presence ratings, measured by the TPI, were generally high, with a mean score of 89.06 (SD 
= 21.26) out of a possible 140. Items with frequently low ratings (rated a three or less out of 
seven) included “how much did it seem as if you could reach out and touch the objects or people 
in the virtual environment” (42.4%), “how often did you want to try to touch something in the 
virtual environment” (68.5%), “to what extent did you feel you could interact with the people in 
the virtual environment” (44.4%), and “how much control over the interaction with the people in 
the virtual environment did you feel you had?” (51.7%). This was not surprising given that there 
were no tactile stimuli as part of the virtual reality environment and the avatars did not verbally 
respond to the participant.  
Symptoms of cybersickness, measured by the SSQ, were somewhat common; however, it is 
important to note that many of the items in the questionnaire overlap with fear symptoms (e.g. 
general discomfort, difficulty focusing, sweating, nausea, difficulty concentrating, stomach 
awareness). The mean SSQ score was 21.66 (SD = 5.47) out of a possible 64. Taken together, 
evaluations of the state anxiety, presence, and cybersickness support the validity of the virtual 
reality speech task in the present study. 
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4.3.6.2 Regression Analyses 
Multiple regression analyses were used to evaluate the criterion validity of the outcome 
probability bias task by testing the hypothesis that outcome probability bias task ratings would 
significantly predict self-reported symptoms of social anxiety, self-reported safety behaviors 
during a speech to a virtual audience, speech length, and subjective distress during the speech. 
Notably, a high degree of correlation among measures, such as the different types of social 
images included in the outcome probability bias task, may contribute to problems with 
multicollinearity (Field, 2013). As such, social images from the outcome probability bias task 
were collapsed across social 1st and social 3rd image types for the controlled block and across 
novel and familiar image types for the automatic block.  
Symptoms of depression and stress, measured by the DASS, were controlled for in all 
analyses, which would provide further support for the discriminant validity of the outcome 
probability bias task. Interpretation bias, measured by the WSAP, was also controlled for in all 
analyses to determine whether outcome probability bias produces effects above and beyond 
interpretation bias. This would promote dissociation between outcome probability bias and 
interpretation bias. As such, DASS stress, DASS depression, WSAP benign bias, and WSAP 
threat bias scores were entered in the first step and mean outcome probability bias task ratings in 
response to social and control images were entered in the second step for all analyses. WSAP 
benign bias scores were calculated by subtracting reaction times for benign rejections from 
reaction times for benign endorsements. WSAP threat bias scores were calculated by subtracting 
reaction times for threat target word rejections from reaction times for threat target word 
endorsements. Results from regression analyses are reported in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 Results from Regression Analyses Assessing the Relations Among the Outcome 
Probability Bias Task in the Main Study and Symptoms of Social Anxiety, Safety 
Behaviors, Speech Length, and Peak Subjective Units of Distress Controlling for 
Symptoms of Depression and Stress and Interpretation Bias 
 
DV Predictor Model β P 95% CI 
LSAS Controlled Block Step 1: F (4, 144) = 
14.48, p < 0.01, R2 = 0.29 
   
 Step 2: F (6, 144) = 
19.87, p < 0.01, ΔR2 = 
0.17 
   
Social Images  0.45 <0.01 0.43 – 0.81 
Control Images  -0.02 0.77 -0.46 – 0.34 
  
 
   
Automatic Block Step 1: F (4, 144) = 
14.48, p < 0.01, R2 = 0.29 
   
 Step 2: F (6, 144) = 
15.21, p < 0.01, ΔR2 = 
0.11 
   
Social Images  0.30 <0.01 0.16 – 0.44 
Control Images  0.11 0.12 -0.04 – 0.34 
   
 
   
SAFE Controlled Block Step 1: F (4, 144) = 7.15, 
p < 0.01, R2 = 0.17 
   
 Step 2: F (6, 144) = 6.95, 
p < 0.01, ΔR2 = 0.06 
   
Social Images  0.27 <0.01 0.05 – 0.24 
Control Images  0.02 0.82 -0.17 – 0.21 
  
 
   
Automatic Block Step 1: F (4, 144) = 7.15, 
p < 0.01, R2 = 0.17 
   
 Step 2: F (6, 144) = 6.38, 
p < 0.01, ΔR2 = 0.05 
   
 Social Images  0.20 0.01 0.02 – 0.14 
 Control Images  0.07 0.35 -0.05 – 0.13 
   
 




Controlled Block Step 1: F (4, 144) = 2.46, 
p = 0.048, R2 = 0.07 
   
  Step 2: F (6, 144) = 1.70, 
p > 0.05, ΔR2 = 0.00 
   
      
 Automatic Block Step 1: F (4, 144) = 2.46, 
p = 0.048, R2 = 0.07 
   
  Step 2: F (4, 144) = 1.66, 
p > 0.05, ΔR2 = 0.00 




Controlled Block Step 1: F (4, 143) = 3.94, 
p < 0.01, R2 = 0.10 
   
  Step 2: F (6, 143) = 6.81, 
p < 0.01, ΔR2 = 0.13 
   
 Social Images  0.41 <0.01 0.03 – 0.08 
 Control Images  -0.14 0.09 -0.09 – 0.01 
      
 Automatic Block Step 1: F (4, 143) = 3.94, 
p < 0.01, R2 = 0.10 
   
  Step 2: F (4, 143) = 4.78, 
p < 0.01, ΔR2 = 0.07 
   
 Social Images  0.28 0.01 0.01 – 0.04 
 Control Images  -0.03 0.67 -0.03 – 0.02 
Note. LSAS = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, SAFE = Subtle Avoidance Frequency 
Examination, BAT = Behavioral Avoidance Test, SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress. 
 
All models were significant for both the automatic and controlled blocks of the outcome 
probability bias task across measures except for speech length. Among the significant models, 
social images were identified as significant predictors and control images were not.  
4.3.7 Factor Structure 
Principal axis factoring with orthogonal (varimax) rotation was used to evaluate the factor 
structure of both blocks of the outcome probability bias task. Varimax rotation maximizes the 
dispersion of factor loadings and is particularly useful for interpretation of factors (Field, 2009). 
4.3.7.1 Controlled Block 
Data from both the pilot study and the main study were combined for the exploratory factor 
analysis of the controlled block (n = 203). Evaluation of the scree plot and eigenvalues indicated 
the presence of 3 factors. Rotated factor loadings are reported in Table 4.5. The first factor was 
primarily comprised of images relevant to public speaking anxiety. The images with the highest 
loadings included images containing audiences, podiums, and microphones. Several images of 
job interviews, shaking hands with someone in a suit, and meetings also loaded on this factor. 
The second factor was composed of social gatherings and parties. Most of the images in the third 
factor were close up images of people’s faces. The rest were images where people seem to be 
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making negatively judgmental facial expressions. None of the control images loaded 
significantly on any of the factors. 
Table 4.5 Rotated Factor Loadings from Exploratory Factor Analysis of Outcome 
Probability Bias Task Controlled Block 
  
Image Filename Image Description Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Social009e public speaking 0.87 0.10 0.12 
Canva37e publlic speaking 0.83 0.16 0.18 
Canva4 public speaking 0.83 0.18 0.09 
Canva34e public speaking 0.82 0.11 0.11 
Canva39e public speaking 0.79 0.03 0.14 
Canva42e public speaking 0.78 0.15 0.22 
Social002 public speaking 0.78 0.13 0.13 
Canva35e public speaking 0.77 0.25 0.06 
Social045e public speaking 0.77 0.19 0.21 
Canva27 public speaking 0.76 0.15 0.17 
Canva40e interview 0.76 0.14 0.16 
Canva44e interview 0.76 0.09 0.19 
Canva33e public speaking 0.75 0.11 0.11 
Canva28 public speaking 0.74 0.18 0.07 
Canva23 interview 0.74 0.07 0.26 
Canva36e public speaking 0.73 0.08 0.20 
Canva5 public speaking 0.70 0.18 0.31 
Social044e interview 0.70 0.18 0.22 
Canva2 interview 0.68 0.10 0.22 
Canva79 interview 0.67 0.26 0.00 
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Canva25 interview 0.67 0.19 0.20 
Canva67e business meeting 0.66 0.23 0.14 
Social024e asking teacher a question 0.62 0.29 0.04 
Canva1 handshake 0.61 0.29 0.07 
Canva58e business meeting 0.61 0.13 0.27 
Canva69e raising hand in talk 0.61 0.26 0.21 
Canva68e in front of class 0.60 0.23 0.13 
Canva41e interview 0.60 0.00 0.43 
Canva29e handshake 0.58 0.30 -0.01 
Canva24 handshake 0.54 0.22 0.02 
Canva64e public setting 0.54 0.21 0.34 
Canva31e handshake 0.53 0.29 -0.03 
Social037 audience 0.52 0.08 0.19 
Canva62e meeting 0.52 0.18 0.21 
Canva63e working with teacher 0.51 0.25 0.02 
Social004 audience 0.50 0.22 0.22 
Canva76e meeting 0.47 0.36 0.01 
Canva73e working with teacher 0.41 0.22 0.11 
Canva21 eye-contact man working 0.38 0.34 0.17 
Canva12 business meeting 0.38 0.26 0.35 
Canva14 meeting 0.36 0.34 0.09 
Social039 audience 0.30 0.14 0.14 
Canva47e party 0.26 0.72 -0.03 
Canva13 bar 0.25 0.69 0.14 
Canva50e party 0.24 0.68 0.08 
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Canva56e party 0.25 0.67 0.08 
Canva55e bar 0.26 0.66 0.06 
Canva48e party 0.20 0.65 0.08 
Canva43e party 0.31 0.62 0.01 
Canva75e 3 people drinking 0.25 0.52 0.31 
Canva8 students working, smiling 0.32 0.51 0.05 
Faces234 party 0.14 0.49 0.04 
Canva54e party 0.29 0.46 0.21 
Canva6 two women in elevator 0.21 0.45 0.27 
Canva51e bar 0.14 0.45 0.34 
Canva49e party 0.29 0.37 0.25 
Canva18 eating in public 0.18 0.37 0.24 
Canva20 face 0.22 0.01 0.77 
Social010 face 0.24 0.16 0.74 
Canva15 face 0.36 0.03 0.71 
Canva19 face 0.30 0.09 0.70 
Canva3 bored panel 0.43 -0.04 0.57 
Canva10 gossiping girls 0.39 0.22 0.57 
Canva9 3 people strong eye-contact 0.34 0.20 0.51 
Faces300 face 0.12 0.10 0.47 
Canva78e meeting 0.31 0.22 0.47 
Canva7 girls whispering  0.36 0.35 0.40 
Faces142 face 0.17 0.11 0.39 
Social059 face 0.24 0.10 0.38 
Social029 face 0.16 0.19 0.36 
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Canva22 walking into a talk 0.18 0.20 0.32 
N172 control 0.23 0.05 0.08 
N497 control 0.12 0.07 0.07 
N496 control 0.10 -0.01 0.06 
N606 control 0.10 0.04 0.00 
N197 control 0.08 0.22 0.05 
N566 control 0.07 0.05 0.03 
N200 control 0.07 0.12 0.07 
N323 control 0.06 0.09 -0.06 
N706 control 0.05 0.07 0.05 
N499 control 0.05 0.17 0.10 
N132 control 0.04 -0.05 0.08 
N498 control 0.04 0.23 0.01 
N293 control 0.03 0.06 -0.06 
N574 control 0.02 0.03 0.15 
N221 control 0.02 0.10 0.07 
N170 control 0.01 0.09 0.14 
N572 control 0.00 0.03 0.11 
N296 control -0.01 0.12 0.09 
N477 control -0.01 0.09 0.03 
N101 control -0.01 0.01 0.14 
N654 control -0.01 0.03 0.01 
N282 control -0.03 0.10 0.02 
N144 control -0.06 0.02 0.16 
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Factor correlations 
Factor 1  1   
Factor 2  .64* 1  
Factor 3  .65* .56* 1 
Note. Extraction done via principal axis factoring with varimax rotation. The strongest loading 
for each image is in boldface. Loadings at or above .30 are shown in italics if the loading is not 
the strongest for that particular image. 
 
Means and standard deviations for the factors are reported in Table 4.6. Means and standard 
deviations for participants with social anxiety symptom scores above and below the clinical 
cutoff (60; Mennin et al., 2012) are also reported.  
Table 4.6 Means and Standard Deviations of Outcome Probability Bias for Each Factor 
Identified in Exploratory Factor Analysis of Controlled Block: Overall and Separated by 
Social Anxiety Symptom Clinical Cutoff 
 
Factor Overall M (SD) Below LSAS Cutoff M (SD) Above LSAS Cutoff M (SD) 
1 47.94 (22.38) 37.91 (22.47) 58.39 (18.43) 
2 28.61 (19.66) 20.32 (16.13) 35.10 (18.66) 
3 50.72 (20.93) 41.92 (22.29) 58.29 (16.18) 
Note. LSAS = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
A 3 (factors) x 2 (social anxiety symptom score above or below the clinical cutoff) mixed-
design ANOVA revealed significant main effects of factor F (2, 292) = 123.22, p < 0.01, partial 
η2 = 0.46) and social anxiety symptom score (F (1, 146) = 41.51, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.22). 
Contrasts revealed mean outcome probability bias task ratings were significantly lower for the 
second factor relative to the first factor (F (1, 146) = 173.92, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.54) and the 
third factor (F (1, 146) = 196.05, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.57). Outcome probability bias task 
ratings did not significantly differ between the first and the third factor (p > 0.05).  For the main 
effect of social anxiety symptom score, mean outcome probability bias task ratings were higher 
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among participants with social anxiety symptom scores above the clinical cutoff compared to 
those with scores below the clinical cutoff across all factors. The interaction between factors and 
social anxiety symptom scores was not significant (p > 0.05; see Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.5 Mean Outcome Probability Bias Task Ratings for Factor Structures Identified 
in Exploratory Factor Analysis of Controlled Block Separated by Social Anxiety 
Symptom Clinical Cutoff 
 
4.3.7.2 Automatic Block 
Only data from the main study were used for the exploratory factor analysis of the automatic 
block (n = 148). Again, evaluation of the scree plot and eigenvalues indicated the presence of 3 
factors (see Table 4.7). Because automatic trials contained three images of the same type, factor 
loadings are reported for trial image type rather than individual images. The first factor in the 
present analysis was similar to the first factor from the controlled block and was composed of 
images of public speaking and interviews. The second factor included trials with images of 
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threatening facial expressions, consistent with the third factor from the controlled block. The two 
control trials loaded on factor three.  
Table 4.7 Rotated Factor Loadings from Exploratory Factor Analysis of Automatic Block 
Image Type Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Interview (Novel) 0.84 0.11 0.11 
Public Speaking (Familiar) 0.79 0.28 0.07 
Interview (Familiar) 0.78 0.26 0.13 
Public Speaking (New) 0.68 0.17 0.20 
Faces (New) 0.20 0.87 0.00 
Faces (Familiar) 0.31 0.80 -0.05 
Control Buildings 0.09 -0.03 0.91 
Control Objects 0.19 -0.01 0.74 
Note. Extraction done via principal axis factoring with varimax rotation. The strongest loading 
for each trial is in boldface. Loadings at or above .30 are shown in italics if the loading is not the 
strongest for that particular trial. 
 
4.4 Main Study Discussion 
4.4.1 Reliability, Convergent Validity, Discriminant Validity, Construct Validity, and 
Criterion Validity 
The present pattern of results supports the reliability, convergent validity, discriminant 
validity, construct validity, and criterion validity of the outcome probability bias task. Internal 
consistency ranged from good to excellent for all stimulus types (α = 0.82 – 0.96), supporting 
reliability. Social images included in the outcome probability bias task demonstrated moderate 
and significant positive correlations with a standardized paper-and-pencil measure of outcome 
probability bias (r = 0.33 – 0.48), supporting convergent validity. The outcome probability bias 
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task demonstrated stronger correlations with conceptually similar measures (paper-and-pencil 
questionnaires of outcome probability bias and outcome cost bias; controlled block: r = 0.42 – 
0.48; automatic block: r = 0.29 – 0.33) relative to conceptually dissimilar measures (self-report 
questionnaires of depression and stress; controlled block: r = 0.28 - 0.36; automatic block: r = 
0.18 – 0.21), supporting convergent and discriminant validity (DeVellis, 2011). Outcome 
probability bias task ratings were higher in response to social images relative to nonsocial 
images, supporting construct validity. Ratings were also higher among participants with self-
reported symptoms of social anxiety above a clinical cutoff score than those with scores below a 
clinical cutoff score, also supporting construct validity. In addition, social images in the task 
demonstrated positive and significant associations with self-reported symptoms of social anxiety 
(LSAS; β = 0.30 – 0.45, p < 0.05), consistent with findings from other studies that relied on 
paper-and-pencil questionnaires to measure outcome probability bias (Calamaras et al., 2015; 
Hoffart et al., 2009; O’Toole et al., 2015; Smits et al., 2006), supporting criterion validity. Social 
images in the task were also positively associated with self-reported safety behaviors (SAFE; β = 
0.20 – 0.27, p < 0.05) and subjective units of distress during a virtual reality speech task (SUDS; 
β = 0.28 – 0.41, p < 0.05). These relations were significant while controlling for interpretation 
bias and self-reported symptoms of depression and stress, further supporting criterion and 
discriminant validity of the outcome probability bias task.  
Two findings were not consistent with the proposed hypotheses. First, I hypothesized that 
there would be a positive, significant relation between the outcome probability bias task and 
speech length during the virtual reality behavioral avoidance test (BAT), but there was none. 
Ceiling effects may have contributed to this finding, as 55 participants (37%) spoke for the full 
10 minutes, the modal speech length. This contributed to significant negative skew in the data 
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and could have increased the likelihood of a false negative result (Fayers, 2011), as limited 
variability may contribute to limited power to detect an effect. In support of this view, all 
significant correlations between speech length and other theoretically related measures 
(interpretation bias, self-reported symptoms of social anxiety, self-reported safety behaviors) 
were weaker than expected.  
Alternatively, this null result could indicate that the virtual reality speech task failed to 
induce anxiety. Though a virtual reality behavioral avoidance test has been shown to be feasible 
for assessment of specific phobia (Mühlberger et al., 2008), the feasibility of a virtual reality 
behavioral avoidance test designed to induce public speaking anxiety has never been evaluated in 
a non-clinical sample. This alternative explanation is unlikely, however, as post-speech state 
anxiety ratings were significantly higher among participants with social anxiety symptom scores 
above the clinical cutoff compared to participants with scores below the clinical cutoff, 
suggesting the virtual reality speech task was effective at inducing anxiety among people for 
whom it would likely be a fear-relevant social situation.  
Another possible interpretation of this null finding is that outcome probability bias may not 
relate to behavioral avoidance. In support of this view, speech length was also unrelated to a 
paper-and-pencil questionnaire of outcome probability bias (OPQ) in the present study. Lack of a 
relation between outcome probability bias and behavioral avoidance is inconsistent with theories 
of social anxiety disorder (Clark, 2001; Clark & Wells, 1995; Heimberg et al., 2010; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997), so these unexpected findings warrant additional research. For example, the 
outcome probability bias task could be modified to induce either a positive or negative outcome 
probability bias. Following outcome probability bias training, participants would complete an 
unmodified version of the task to verify a bias had been induced successfully. Subsequently, 
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participants would be instructed to engage in a behavioral avoidance test. Higher levels of 
avoidance (measured by speech length and/or safety behaviors) among participants in the 
negative outcome probability bias condition relative to those in the positive bias condition would 
indicate that outcome probability bias does, in fact, contribute to behavioral avoidance. 
Second, I hypothesized there would be higher ratings in the automatic block for familiar 
images relative to novel images among participants who completed the controlled block first, but 
this was not the case. One of the goals of the main study was to evaluate the extent to which the 
availability heuristic may be contributing to probability assessments at an automatic level of 
processing. In the pilot study, outcome probability bias task ratings were higher, on average, 
when participants completed the controlled block first as compared to completing the automatic 
block first. Because some of the images were used in both blocks, participants who completed 
the controlled block first (during which the images were processed at a slower rate) were likely 
to be familiar with the images when they appeared for the second time during the automatic 
block. Increased familiarity has been shown to enhance the availability heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). As such, this order effect potentially supported the effect of the availability 
heuristic on outcome probability bias.  
Alternatively, higher ratings could have resulted from increased experience with the task 
among those who had already completed the controlled block. This interpretation was supported 
by the presence of an order effect in the controlled block in the main study: participants who 
completed the automatic block first gave higher outcome probability bias task ratings during the 
controlled block relative to those who completed the controlled block first. The automatic block 
in the main study was modified in order to rule out increased experience as an alternative 
explanation for higher outcome probability bias task ratings among participants who completed 
75 
the controlled block first. In the main study, automatic trials containing novel images from the 
same category (i.e. public speaking, interview) that were not included in the controlled block 
were added. I hypothesized that order effects would be present for familiar images, but not for 
novel images. Though outcome probability bias task ratings were higher for familiar images 
relative to novel images among those who completed the controlled block first relative to those 
who completed the automatic block first, this difference was not statistically significant. Notably, 
familiar images were rated higher than novel images regardless of block order, suggesting that 
the novel images may not have been comparable to the familiar images despite the fact that they 
depicted the same social themes. Additional research using the automatic block with more trials 
and using familiar and novel images with previously established outcome probability ratings that 
are comparable is needed to clarify the role of the availability heuristic versus demand bias in 
outcome probability bias. 
The fact that the outcome probability bias task significantly predicted symptoms of social 
anxiety while controlling for interpretation bias should be interpreted with caution. The aim of 
this analysis was to test discriminant validity. More specifically, I hypothesized that the outcome 
probability bias task would positively predict symptoms of social anxiety above and beyond 
variability accounted for by interpretation bias, and this would support the dissociation between 
these two constructs. Notably, the interpretation bias measure included in the present study 
(WSAP) was weakly correlated with social anxiety symptoms measured by the LSAS (r = 0.17). 
Other researchers have found that this measure of interpretation bias is positively related to 
social anxiety symptoms with medium to large effect sizes (Gonsalves et al., 2019), so the weak 
correlation in the present study is puzzling. It is possible that method variance could have led to 
poor precision of the measure in this study. Fatigue may have contributed to poor precision 
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because the study procedure typically took one to two hours to complete and the interpretation 
bias task was the final task.  Another source of method variance is that the outcome probability 
bias task is an imagery-based task and the interpretation bias task is a verbal-based task.   
4.4.2 Factor Structure 
I designed the outcome probability bias task with the intent of measuring a single latent 
variable: outcome probability bias. Images included in the task, however, were quite diverse and 
reflected a wide variety of social situations that have the potential to result in negative judgment, 
embarrassment, or humiliation (e.g. public speaking, going to a party, being stared at). An 
exploratory factor analysis was used to investigate the extent to which there may be different 
subfactors of outcome probability bias that, to date, have yet to be identified.  
Analysis of the controlled and automatic blocks yielded three factors. The first factor was 
primarily comprised of images most commonly identified by pilot participants as anxiety 
provoking in their anecdotal feedback (public speaking, interviews). The second factor contained 
images of parties, social gatherings, and drinking in public. The third factor included images that 
emphasized negative, judgmental, or threatening facial expressions. Analyses revealed mean 
outcome probability bias task ratings were significantly higher for the first and third factors 
relative to the second factor. Given that the second factor is composed of images of parties, this 
second factor may only elicit outcome probability bias among those with more generalized 
symptoms of social anxiety.  
Alternatively, the distinction between the second factor and the other two factors may reflect 
differences in outcome probability bias when responding to social images with positive, neutral, 
and negative valences. Many of the images in the first factor are ambiguous. Images in the 
second factor commonly feature people who are smiling and appear to be enjoying themselves. 
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Images in the third factor include people with negative or threatening facial expressions. As 
such, outcome probability bias may be differentially relevant to anticipation of positive and 
negative social encounters. Relatedly, researchers have found that people with social anxiety 
experience fear of positive and negative evaluation (Weeks, Heimberg, Rodebaugh, & Norton, 
2008). Going forward, it may be important for researchers to specify the nature of outcome 
probability bias (negative or positive) and the type of social situation that elicits this bias 
(commonly anticipated to be threatening, ambiguous, or rewarding). 
Future research is needed to explore potential differences in the relations among the factors 
identified in the controlled block of the outcome probability bias task and symptoms of social 
anxiety. Higher levels of outcome probability bias in response to the second factor, for example, 
could potentially be associated with more generalized, more severe, and/or more treatment 
resistant symptoms of social anxiety. For example, expectation violations necessary for effective 
exposure therapy (Craske et al., 2008) may be more difficult to achieve if outcome probability 
bias is more generalized and applies to social situations when people without social anxiety 
disorder tend to predict a positive outcome is more likely. A longitudinal exposure-based 
treatment study involving regular administration of the outcome probability bias task to a clinical 
sample of people with specific and generalized symptoms of social anxiety disorder could shed 
light on this possibility. Before such research is undertaken, a confirmatory factor analysis will 
be needed to demonstrate stability of the three factors identified in the current study. Evaluation 
of the outcome probability bias task in an independent sample is recommended for more valid 
hypothesis testing of factor structure (DeVellis, 2011).  
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4.4.3 Recommended Changes for Future Use 
The outcome probability bias task would benefit from a significant reduction in items. The 
high internal consistency of social items and very strong correlation between the social 1st and 
social 3rd images in the controlled block indicate redundancy among the images. Further, 
exploratory factor analyses did not identify separate factors between social 1st and social 3rd 
images, indicating the distinction between these image types may have been unnecessary. 
Replication of the present findings with a clinical sample may be needed to verify this, however, 
because utilization of mental imagery of the self as seen by the audience is more common among 
people with social anxiety disorder relative to those without the disorder (Hackmann et al., 1998; 
Wells et al., 1998). Outcome probability bias task ratings may therefore be higher in response to 
social 3rd images relative to social 1st images among people with social anxiety disorder but not 
for those without the disorder. 
The Spearman-Brown prophecy formula (Brown, 1910; Spearman, 1910) was used to 
indicate how many items should be kept to maintain an internal consistency of 0.92. The result 
indicated 27%, or approximately 20 images would be sufficient. As such, it is feasible to divide 
the images included in the controlled block of the outcome probability bias task in half and 
develop two “forms” of the task. This would allow for further evaluation of the task’s reliability. 
Another recommendation for change is to make the stimulus presentation duration for the 
controlled block constant rather than self-paced. Notably, some of the participants rapidly 
advanced to the rating screen during the controlled block. It is possible, therefore, that they 
viewed the images just as quickly as they did the automatic trials during the automatic block, 
limiting the construct validity of the controlled block. Based on research from Calvo et al. 
(1999), controlled block images should be set to 1000ms. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
The current study presents the first computer task designed to measure outcome probability 
bias in social anxiety. Results demonstrate this task’s good to excellent internal consistency, 
support the task’s validity, and identify a tripartite factor structure. It is also the first study to 
evaluate outcome probability bias from automatic and controlled levels of processing and the 
first to attempt to dissociate outcome probability bias from interpretation bias.  
Researchers have suggested that outcome probability bias results from the availability 
heuristic (Butler & Mathews, 1983) and may manifest at both controlled and automatic levels of 
processing (Beck & Clark, 1997). To date, studies of outcome probability bias have only 
measured this construct at a controlled level of processing. Better understanding of the role of 
automatic processing in outcome probability bias can inform theoretical models of cognitive 
mechanisms in anxiety. The present study used rapid presentation of images to assess whether 
outcome probability bias is manifest at an automatic level of processing.  
It can be challenging, however, for researchers to experimentally isolate automatic processes. 
In fact, McNally (1995) has claimed that it may not be possible to develop an experimental task 
that fully isolates automatic processing. Consistent with this, Jacoby (1998) has indicated that all 
tasks measure levels of processing on a spectrum from mostly automatic to mostly controlled. 
Therefore, the automatic block of the outcome probability bias task likely elicited responding 
that incorporated some controlled processing. Jacoby’s (1998) process dissociation procedure 
can be used to assess the degree of automatic processing measured in a task. In this procedure, 
estimates of controlled and automatic processing are estimated by assessing responses that are 
similar to or different from a previously made response. The present study’s design was not 
compatible with this procedure. Instead, automaticity was evaluated through accuracy in 
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response to comprehension questions about the images and confidence ratings. In the main study, 
mean accuracy of responses to comprehension questions was just above the level of chance and 
average confidence ratings were fairly low, supporting a high degree of automatic processing in 
the automatic block. 
Controlled processing has been shown to interfere with biased judgments that result from the 
availability heuristic. In Menon and Raghubir’s (2003) study, for example, the availability 
heuristic did not affect participants’ judgments when they were aware of the potential for this 
bias, but only if participants were aware of the potential for biased processing before they made a 
judgment and if they were under conditions of low cognitive load. This may inform the 
mechanism through which cognitive restructuring contributes to reductions in outcome 
probability bias in treatment. Increased awareness of cognitive errors and monitoring of thoughts 
may attune people to the potential for unrealistic thinking and prevent it before it starts. This 
approach may only be effective, however, when people are not experiencing high cognitive load 
(e.g. from stress, distractions, or even symptoms). Experimental manipulation of outcome 
probability bias is needed to test this possibility.  
For example, a modified version of the outcome probability bias task could be used to induce 
negative outcome probability bias among people without social anxiety disorder. After a test 
phase demonstrating successful induction of bias, participants could receive psychoeducation 
about the impact of the availability heuristic on judgments of probability before viewing and 
rating a new set of images, half of which are novel and half of which are familiar. Reminders of 
the effect of familiarity on judgment could be given before or after participants viewed the 
images. Participants would then give their ratings of outcome probability. Participants could also 
respond to the new set of images under conditions of high or low cognitive load. Outcome 
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probability bias would be expected to persist among participants who received reminders about 
the impact of familiarity on judgment after viewing the images and among participants under 
high cognitive load. Outcome probability bias ratings may be reduced in response to reminders 
about the impact of familiarity on judgment before viewing the images and among participants 
under low cognitive load. This pattern of results would support the role of the availability 
heuristic in outcome probability bias. Inclusion of measures of symptoms of social anxiety 
before and after this procedure could also be used to clarify the conditions under which cognitive 
restructuring may reduce symptoms through reduction of outcome probability bias. 
Evaluation of outcome probability bias at an automatic level of processing may also inform 
the dissociation of outcome probability bias from interpretation bias. Interpretation bias and 
outcome probability bias have sometimes been conflated in the literature (Mathews and 
MacLeod, 1994). Though others have argued that outcome probability bias and interpretation 
bias are distinct (Amir et al., 1998; Blanchette & Richards, 2010), this is the first study to test 
this possibility. Beck and Clark’s (1997) information processing model of anxiety posits that 
outcome probability bias manifests in the immediate preparation stage, which involves a 
combination of automatic and controlled processing, and interpretation bias manifests in the 
secondary elaboration stage, which only involves controlled processing. In support of this model, 
previous research indicates that interpretation bias is not detected when stimuli are presented at 
shorter durations, conditions under which automatic processing predominates (e.g. Calvo & 
Castillo, 1997; Richards & French, 1992). Evidence of outcome probability bias following rapid 
stimulus presentations in the present study may therefore indicate that this bias is distinguishable 
from interpretation bias because it occurs during an earlier stage of cognitive processing (i.e. the 
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immediate preparation stage, which is influenced by a combination of automatic and controlled 
processing; Beck & Clark, 1997). 
Notably, all known studies that have evaluated interpretation bias resulting from automatic 
processing have utilized verbal tasks. It is possible that automatic effects on interpretation bias 
aren’t detectible for lexical tasks but are detectible for visual ones. As such, interpretation bias 
may, in fact, result from automatic processing but this has yet to be detected due to sole reliance 
on verbal tasks to assess it. Further research on interpretation bias using visual stimuli is needed 
to explore this possibility. The present task format could potentially be modified for this purpose. 
For example, participants could view rapidly presented images or short videos of socially 
ambiguous situations that elicit a third-person perspective. Participants could then quickly 
choose from two images that disambiguate the previous stimulus in either a benign or threatening 
manner. Higher proportions of threatening images would reflect greater interpretation bias. 
Though replication and additional reliability and validity testing is needed, the present results 
show promise that the outcome probability bias task could be used for experimental 
manipulation of this construct. Currently, the causal role of outcome probability bias in social 
anxiety disorder is unknown. Though theories of social anxiety disorder posit that outcome 
probability bias causes symptoms (Clark, 2001; Clark & Wells, 1995; Heimberg et al., 2010; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), it could be produced by them. Similar to manipulation of measures of 
attention and interpretation bias to allow for cognitive bias modification (Hertel & Mathews, 
2011), it may be possible to alter the present task to simulate outcome probability bias in people 
with low levels of social and public speaking anxiety. Outcome probability bias may potentially 
be induced using the present task by incorporating feedback about the actual likelihood of social 
embarrassment. Alternatively, participants could be presented with images showing a negative 
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outcome from the social situation that was rated previously. Participants would complete many 
trials with consistent feedback that the likelihood of social embarrassment was high. I would 
expect outcome probability ratings to increase over the course of training. Participants would rate 
new images with higher levels of negative outcome probability relative to participants who 
received no training or positive outcome probability bias training. I would also expect higher 
levels of symptoms of social anxiety following completion of negative outcome probability bias 
induction relative to those who received positive outcome probability bias induction.  
These methods could also be used in the development of a cognitive bias modification 
paradigm designed to reduce outcome probability bias and improve symptoms of social anxiety. 
This could be achieved by providing feedback indicating the likelihood of a feared outcome is 
low over multiple trials. Notably, it may be important to only use first-person imagery in an 
outcome probability bias modification paradigm due to the negative impact of mental 
representations of the self as seen by the audience on symptoms and performance (Hirsch et al., 
2003; Hirsch et al., 2004; Spurr & Stopa, 2003; Stopa & Jenkins, 2007; Vassilopoulos, 2005). 
Research shows that cognitive biases and self-imagery interact and may contribute to symptoms 
(Hirsch et al., 2007). Engagement in third-person imagery while anticipating a social encounter 
may therefore interfere with potential ameliorative effects of outcome probability bias 
modification training. In contrast, training participants to engage in more first-person imagery 
may enhance therapeutic effects of outcome probability bias modification training. This could be 
tested by randomly assigning a sample of people with social anxiety disorder to receive outcome 
probability bias modification training containing only first- or third-person images. Training with 
first-person images may predict a greater reduction in outcome probability bias and in symptoms 
of social anxiety compared to training with third-person images. Alternatively, training with 
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third-person images may be akin to exposure therapy, where greater anxiety induced by the 
images due to the third-person perspective may enhance expectancy violation (Craske et al., 
2008) and therefore convey a greater therapeutic effect. 
Outcome probability bias is present in a variety of other anxiety and related disorders in 
addition to social anxiety disorder, including specific phobia (Menzies & Clarke, 1995), 
generalized anxiety disorder (Butler & Mathews, 1983), agoraphobia (McNally & Foa, 1987; 
Poulton & Andrews, 1996), panic disorder (Uren et al., 2004) and acute stress disorder (Warda & 
Bryant, 1998). The present task may be adapted to assess, and potentially manipulate, outcome 
probability bias associated with these disorders as well. Given that bias has been found to be 
specific to the type of disorder (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2000; Poulton & Andrews, 1996; Uren 
et al., 2004), the social images included in the present outcome probability bias task may not be 
applicable to other disorders and would need to be replaced with images (or even short video 
clips) of situations in which escape is not possible (agoraphobia), people displaying symptoms of 
a heart attack (panic disorder), situations that commonly induce worry such as financial ruin 
(generalized anxiety disorder), or stimuli commonly used in exposure therapy for trauma (acute 
stress disorder). The SFIP contains several high-quality images of blood and spiders that could 
be used to modify the task for outcome probability bias in specific phobia (Michałowski et al., 
2017). Regarding acute stress disorder, research has shown that early exposure-based 
intervention can improve prognosis and prevent development of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(Kearns et al., 2012). As such, an outcome probability bias modification program containing 
images from a recent trauma affecting many individuals (such as the COVID-19 pandemic) 
could potentially be an intervention for acute stress geared towards prevention of posttraumatic 
stress disorder. 
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A notable limitation of the present study is generalizability of the outcome probability bias 
task to other populations due to use of a nonclinical sample of college students. The use of a 
convenience sample of college students can lead to unreliable estimates of behavior and limit 
replicability of findings (Peterson & Merunka, 2014). Generalizability of findings to a clinical 
sample is unknown. Another limitation to the present study is that the construct validity of the 
controlled block was limited by the self-paced stimulus presentation duration, as some 
participants may have viewed the images too quickly to allow for controlled processing. In 
addition, it was not possible to measure the test-retest reliability of the outcome probability bias 
task because the task was only administered once. It is possible that outcome probability bias is 
stable over time, but this has not been examined in the literature. Researchers have found that 
participants with social anxiety disorder who completed a randomized controlled trial 
approximately 5 years prior reported similar (improved) levels of outcome probability bias at 
post-treatment and long-term follow-up (Benbow & Anderson, 2019). Longitudinal research is 
needed, however, to truly establish the course of outcome probability bias over time. Assuming 
outcome probability bias is stable, evaluation of test-retest reliability will be important for the 
internal validity of any studies that may use the outcome probability bias task in the future.  
Another important limitation to consider is that it was not possible to determine if 
participants were rating the images based on their perceptions of outcome probability or simply 
based on the level of anxiety evoked by the image. Several studies investigating the role of the 
availability heuristic in probability judgments indicate that probability judgments are impacted 
by trait anxiety and memory for relevant outcomes more so than priming or state anxiety (Butler 
& Mathews, 1987; Johnson & Tversky, 1983; MacLeod & Campbell, 1992; Zelenski & Larsen, 
86 
2002); however, the effect of priming and state anxiety on probability judgments using the 
present paradigm is unknown.  
Despite these limitations, the present study details the development of a new tool that could 
enhance our understanding of outcome probability bias in social anxiety. Pending replication of 
the psychometric properties found in the current study, researchers may potentially use this task 
for multimodal assessment, experimental manipulation, and even treatment of outcome 
probability bias in social anxiety and other related disorders. In addition, further evaluation of the 
factor structure of this task could reveal new subfactors of outcome probability bias and inform 
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A: Outcome Probability Bias Task Stimuli 
Appendix A.1 List of Images Included in Outcome Probability Bias Task 
Stimulus 





































































































































































Note. Images highlighted in grey were only used as practice trial images for the 
controlled block. Images highlighted in blue were used in the controlled block and as practice 
trial images for the automatic block. Images in boldface were used in the main study automatic 
block. 
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Note. Was1, Was2, and Was3 refer to comprehension question items. CorrectAns identifies the 


























Appendix B: Self Report Questionnaires 
Appendix B.1 Outcome Probability Questionnaire 
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Appendix B.3 Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
Please read each situation carefully and provide an answer to each column for that situation. The first 
column refers to how anxious or fearful you feel in the situation. The second refers to how often you 
avoid the situation. If you come across a situation that you ordinarily do not experience, we ask that you 
imagine "what if you were faced with that situation," and then, rate the degree to which you would fear 
this hypothetical situation and how often you would tend to avoid it. Please base your ratings on the way 
that the situations have affected you in the last week.  
 
  Fear or 
Anxiety 
 
0 = None 
1 = Mild 
2 = Moderate 
3 = Severe 
Avoidance 
 
0 = Never (0%) 
1 = Occasionally (1-33%) 
2 = Often (33-67%) 
3 = Usually (67-100%) 
1. Telephoning in public (P)   
2. Participating in small groups (P)   
3. Eating in public places (P)   
4. Drinking with others in public places (P)   
5. Talking to people in authority (S)   
6. Acting, performing or giving a talk in front 
of an audience (P) 
  
7. Going to a party (S)   
8. Working while being observed (P)   
9. Writing while being observed (P)   
10. Calling someone you don’t know very well 
(S) 
  
11. Talking with people you don’t know very 
well (S) 
  
12. Meeting strangers (S)   
13. Urinating n a public bathroom (P)   




15. Being the center of attention (S)   
16. Speaking up at a meeting (P)   
17. Taking a test (P)   
18. Expressing a disagreement or disapproval to 
people you don’t know very well (S) 
  
19. Looking at people you don’t know very well 
in the eyes (S) 
  
20. Giving a report to a group (P)   
21. Trying to pick up someone (P)   
22. Returning goods to a store (S)   
23. Giving a party (S)   




Appendix B.4 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
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Appendix B.5 Depression Anxiety Stress Scale 
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VAR NAME LDNG ITEM 
PLACE .89 How much did it seem as if the objects and people you saw/heard had 
come to the place you were? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
TOUCH .88 How much did it seem as if you could reach out and touch the objects 
or people you saw/heard? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
OBJECT .83 How often when an object seemed to be headed toward you did you 
want to move to get out of its way? 
(Never - Always [7 points]) 
BETHERE .79 To what extent did you experience a sense of being there inside the 
environment you saw/heard? 
(Not at all – Very much [7 points]) 
SNDLOCAL .72 To what extent did it seem that sounds came from specific different 
locations? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
TOUCHSMG .68 How often did you want to or try to touch something you saw/heard? 
(Never - Always [7 points]) 
WINDOW .58 Did the experience seem more like looking at the events/people on a 
movie screen or more like looking at the events/people through a 
window? 
(Like a movie screen – Like a window [7 points]) 
 
EIGENVALUE: 4.19 
VARIANCE EXPLAINED: 59.85 
STANDARDIZED CRONBACH'S ALPHA:  .91 
 
SOCIAL PRESENCE - ACTOR W/I MEDIUM (PARASOCIAL INTERACTION): 
 
VAR NAME LDNG ITEM 
PPLSEEU .83 How often did you have the sensation that people you saw/heard could 
also see/hear you? 
(Never - Always [7 points]) 
INTERACT .82 To what extent did you feel you could interact with the person or 
people you saw/heard? 
(None - Very much [7 points]) 
LEFTPLCE .79 How much did it seem as if you and the people you saw/heard both left 
the places where you were and went to a new place? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
TOGETHER .78 How much did it seem as if you and the people you saw/heard were 
together in the same place? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
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TALKTOYU .77 How often did it feel as if someone you saw/heard in the environment 
was talking directly to you? 
(Never - Always [7 points]) 
EYECONT .68 How often did you want to or did you make eye-contact with someone 
you saw/heard? 
(Never - Always [7 points]) 
CONTRINT .67 Seeing and hearing a person through a medium constitutes an 
interaction with him or her. How much control over the interaction with 
the person or people you saw/heard did you feel you had? 
(None - Very much [7 points]) 
 
EIGENVALUE: 4.08 
VARIANCE EXPLAINED: 58.24 




SOCIAL PRESENCE - PASSIVE INTERPERSONAL: 
 
VAR NAME LDNG ITEM 
FACEEXPR .89 During the media experience how well were you able to observe the 
facial expressions of the people you saw/heard? 
(Not well - Very well [7 points]) 
TONEVOIC .85 During the media experience how well were you able to observe the 
changes in tone of voice of the people you saw/heard? 
(Not well - Very well [7 points]) 
STYLDRES .79 During the media experience how well were you able to observe the 
style of dress of the people you saw/heard? 
(Not well - Very well [7 points]) 
BODYLANG .69 During the media experience how well were you able to observe the 
body language of the people you saw/heard? 
(Not well - Very well [7 points]) 
 
EIGENVALUE: 2.61 
VARIANCE EXPLAINED: 65.27 
STANDARDIZED CRONBACH'S ALPHA:  .88 
 
 
SOCIAL PRESENCE - ACTIVE INTERPERSONAL: 
 
VAR NAME LDNG ITEM 
MKSOUND .84 How often did you make a sound out loud (e.g. laugh or speak) in 
response to someone you saw/heard in the media environment? 
(Never - Always [7 points]) 
SMILE .73 How often did you smile in response to someone you saw/heard in the 
media environment? 
(Never - Always [7 points]) 
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SPEAK .61 How often did you want to or did you speak to a person you saw/heard 
in the media environment? 
(Never - Always [7 points]) 
 
EIGENVALUE: 1.61 
VARIANCE EXPLAINED: 53.51 




ENGAGEMENT (MENTAL IMMERSION): 
 
VAR NAME LDNG ITEM 
MENTALIM .86 To what extent did you feel mentally immersed in the experience? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
INVOLVNG .80 How involving was the experience? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
SENSEENG .79 How completely were your senses engaged? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
SENSREAL .79 To what extent did you experience a sensation of reality? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
EXCITING .75 How relaxing or exciting was the experience? 
(Very relaxing - Very exciting [7 points]) 
ENGSTORY .65 How engaging was the story? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
 
EIGENVALUE: 3.61 
VARIANCE EXPLAINED: 60.10 






VAR NAME LDNG ITEM 
REMOTE .85 Please circle the number that best describes your evaluation of the 
media experience: Remote - Immediate (7 points) 
UNEMOTNL .83 Please circle the number that best describes your evaluation of the 
media experience: Unemotional - Emotional (7 points) 
UNRESPON .82 Please circle the number that best describes your evaluation of the 
media experience: Unresponsive - Responsive (7 points) 
DEAD .80 Please circle the number that best describes your evaluation of the 
media experience: Dead - Lively (7 points) 
 
 
IMPERSNL .78 Please circle the number that best describes your evaluation of the 
media experience: Impersonal - Personal (7 points) 
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INSENSTV .76 Please circle the number that best describes your evaluation of the 
media experience: Insensitive - Sensitive (7 points) 
UNSOCBLE .76 Please circle the number that best describes your evaluation of the 
media experience: Unsociable - Sociable (7 points) 
 
EIGENVALUE: 4.48 
VARIANCE EXPLAINED: 63.99 





VAR NAME LDNG ITEM 
WOULDOCR .87 The events I saw/heard would occur in the real world 
(Strongly disagree - Strongly agree [7 points]) 
COULDOCR .76 The events I saw/heard could occur in the real world 
(Strongly disagree - Strongly agree [7 points]) 
OCRWORLD .53 The way in which the events I saw/heard occurred is a lot like the way 
they occur in the real world 
(Strongly disagree - Strongly agree [7 points]) 
 
EIGENVALUE: 1.60 
VARIANCE EXPLAINED: 53.34 





VAR NAME LDNG ITEM 
FEELLIKE .80 Overall how much did touching the things and people in the 
environment you saw/heard feel like it would if you had experienced 
them directly? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
TEMPERAT .74 How much did the heat or coolness (temperature) of the environment 
you saw/heard feel like it would if you had experienced it directly? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
SMELLIKE .70 Overall, how much did the things and people in the environment you 
saw/heard smell like they would had you experienced them directly? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
LOOKLIKE - Overall, how much did the things and people in the environment you 
saw/heard look they would if you had experience them directly 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
SOUNDLKE - Overall, how much did the things and people in the environment you 
saw/heard sound like they would if you had experienced them directly? 
(Not at all - Very much [7 points]) 
 
EIGENVALUE: 1.67 
VARIANCE EXPLAINED: 55.71 
STANDARDIZED CRONBACH'S ALPHA:  .79 
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Appendix B.8 Subtle Avoidance Frequency Examination 
Please rate how frequently you engaged in the following behaviors during the virtual reality speech. 
1-Never      2        3         4         5-Always 
Avoided eye contact 
Remained silent 
Spoke softly 
Spoke in soft sentences 
Kept still to avoid drawing attention to yourself 
Tried to keep tight control over your behavior 
Blanked out or switched off mentally 
Spent time thinking of good excuses for escaping (stopping the speech) 
Avoided speaking certain words (e.g. to prevent stuttering) 
Rehearsed sentences in your mind 
Was reserved about what you said 
Think or say ‘I’m not usually like this’ 
Asked or wanted to ask about your performance 
Imagined you were somewhere else 
Held your stop card or hands tightly 
Accounted for poor performance by saying you didn’t have adequate time to prepare 
Held your arms still 
Tried to think about other things 
Avoided pauses in your speech 
 
Was there anything in the virtual environment that made you feel particularly anxious? 
________________________________________________________________________ 








Appendix B.9 Study Feedback Questionnaire 
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